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2ABSTRACT
CHINS IN THE COURTS: A Problem Not Yet Confronted
by
Ellen Jeanne Perry
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 25, 1979 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of City Planning
The Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar
Association, in 1977, released a draft proposal recommending that thejuvenile court's jurisdiction over children who commit noncriminal
offenses be terminated. This thesis evaluates the efforts of Massa-
chusetts to so reform its juvenile justice system. The thesis also
considers the ambiguous position of the status offender in the juvenile
justice system as well as the consequences for reform when that ambig-
uity is not confronted.
In 1974, Massachusetts "decriminalized" status offenses and, for
the first time, explicitly distinguished between those juveniles who
commit criminal offenses and those who are unruly, truant or runaways.
The delinquents were to remain in the custody of the Department of Youth
Services, the state youth corrections agency. The status offenders were
reclassified as "Children In Need of Services" (CHINS) and were to re-
ceive assistance directly from the courts and the Department of Public
Welfare. In 1977, the Department of Public Welfare implemented a pro-
gram designed to minimize judicial involvement in CHINS cases while
maximizing the provision of DPW services.
The Commonwealth has been unable to successfully implement
either the CHINS law or the DPW plan. Furthermore, although the legis-
lature -removed from the courts all of the powers they once had to compel
status offenders to accept services, it has refused to remove status
offenses from the court's jurisdiction. The courts, therefore, are
merely replicating the role played by the state welfare department.
Finally, Massachusetts has failed to confront the ambiguous
position of status offenders in the juvenile justice system. The legis-
lature has declared that status offenses are not delinquent acts.
Rather, they indicate that the misbehaving youth is in need of services.
DPW responded to the decision with a plan that maximizes service pro-
vision while minimizing the child's contact with the courts. Neverthe-
less, the legislature's continued reliance on the judicial process and
the mechanisms used to identify and control delinquents to provide
services to status offenders belies the notion that CHINS youth are
solely a social welfare problem. This conflict, inherent in the CHINS
law, has prevented successful implementation of both the CHINS law and
the DPW plan.
Thesis Supervisor: Suzann R. Thomas Buckle
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
3ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am most grateful for the guidance and friendship of
Professors Suzann Thomas Buckle and Leonard Buckle. Their assistance
and encouragement will always be fondly recalled.
I would also like to thank the Massachusetts Advocacy Center
and the Howland Gardner Show Foundation for sponsoring the research
upon which this thesis is based. Special thanks to Debbie McKechnie
for her able assistance and thoughtful advice.
Hold fast to dreams
For if dreams die
Life is a broken-winged bird
That cannot fly.
Hold fast to dreams
For if dreams go
Life is a barren field
Frozen with snow.
Langston Hughes
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6INTRODUCTION
The Juvenile Justice Standards Project (JJSP), sponsored by the
Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association,
in 1977 released the draft of a controversial set of standards relating
to the "noncriminal misbehavior" of juveniles. Historically, a major
function of the juvenile courts has been to control unruly children whose
misconduct is sanctioned by law. Aidan R. Gough, the reporter who
drafted the JJSP "Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior",
strongly urged that the juvenile courts be radically reformed.
[T]he present jurisdiction of the juvenile court
over noncriminal misbehavior -- the status offense
jurisdiction -- should be cut short and a system
of voluntary referral to services provided outside
the juvenile justice system adopted in its stead.
As a general principle, the standards seek to eli-
minate coercive official intervention in unruly
child cases. However, because of the particular
problems presented by certain kinds of cases --
youths who run away, who are in circumstances of
immediate jeopardy, who are in need of alternative
living arrangements when they and their parents
cannot agree, and who evidence a need of emergency
medical services -- some carefully limited official
intervention is perserved, though in all cases ward-
ships as a result of the child's nonciminal be-
havior or circumstances is precluded.
The American Bar Association has so far refrained from adopting
this volume due both to the controversial and radical nature of its
recommendations and to the strong opposition of many juvenile court
judges and juvenile justice personnel, Many states, however, have been
reassessing the nature of juvenile court jurisdiction over status offen-
ders. Although no state has yet abolished juvenile court jurisdiction
over noncriminal misbehavior, several states, including Massachusetts,
7have developed programs whose principles reflect many of the basic policy
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arguments contained in the JJSP volume, Careful study of one of these
programs might serve to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of both
the JJSP proposal and the programs presently in effect throughout the
United States.
In many ways, Massachusetts has come close to eliminating juve-
nile court jurisdiction over status offenders, In 1974, the Commonwealth
explicitly distinguished status offenders from delinquents and decreed
that these status offenders were "children in need of services" who
henceforward would receive assistance from the state department of
welfare rather than from the youth corrections agency, as had been done
in the past.3 In addition to "decriminalizing" status offenses by
differentiating them from delinquent or criminal offenses, Massachusetts
took a step toward "dejudicalization" or the elimination of judicial
control over status offenses as well. In 1977, the Department of Public
Welfare (DPW) implemented a program designed to encourage the direct
referral of children in need of services to the Department with minimal
reliance on the courts for coercive action.4  A case study of the Massa-
chusetts program, therefore, might provide the many states considering
adopting plans either similar to that proposed by Gough or presently
in effect in Massachusetts and other states with valuable information and
guidance.
The thesis that follows will look at the Massachusetts case,
first considering how decriminalization has affected the treatment of
status offenders in Massachusetts, It will then focus on the state's
implementation of the new DPW program and its effect on the courts and
8the social welfare system. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the
Massachusetts experience that might prove useful to states considering
"decriminalizing" or "dejudicalizing" status offenses.
9Footnotes
1. A. Gough, IJA-ABA JJSP:
Misbehavior (Cambridge, 19-77) ,
2. Ibid., pp.
Standards Relating to Noncriminal
74 - 83,
3. M.G.L. c. 119 39E - 39J.
4. Massachusetts Social Services Policy Manual,
Need of Services," 106 CMR, c. 230, April, 1978.
"Children In
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CHAPTER I
Status Offenders and the Juvenile Justice System
A. Status Offenders in the Juvenile Courts
The jurisdiction of the juvenile courts generally encompasses
three categories of cases:
1) Delinquency cases in which the juvenile has been
accused of violating the criminal laws of the state;
2) Status offense cases in which the juvenile has been
accused of conduct sanctioned by the state only when
committed by minors; and
3) Care and Protection cases in which parents have been
accused of abusing or neglecting their children,
Despite the existence of diverse juvenile court procedures,
in recent years the phi-losophical posture of the states toward both
delinquent and neglected or abused children has been consistent and
unambiguous. In most instances states have adopted models of interven-
tion-designed to promote that perspective. For example, although there
is a widespread recognition that most delinquent youth have experienced
serious social or economic deprivations, recent Supreme Court decisions
and legislative reforms have increasingly shifted the emphasis of the
juvenile courts away from the youth's personal problems and onto the
alleged criminal nature of his acts, As a result, for delinquent youth
the juvenile process has come to strongly resemble the adult criminal
justice system, Conversely, in care and protection cases the focus is
on the needs of the child rather than on his deeds. The child's welfare
is the factor that justifies state intervention.
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With status offenders, however, there is as yet no consensus
as to either who these youth are or how the state should intervene in
their lives, if at all, It is unclear whether they are considered to
be primarily problem children, like delinquents, or children with
problems, like the abused and neglected. Ostensibly, status offenders
are brought within the purview of the juvenile justice system because
they are in need of assistance. Historically, no distinction had been
made between the youth who committed criminal offenses and status offen-
ders. The juvenile justice system was developed to aid all troubled
youth, not just the criminal offender.1
Neglect, disobedience, and crime were viewed as parts
of a single process, moving from parental failure to
criminality. Moreover, like causes produced like pre-
scriptions, Since deviance resulted from parental
neglect, provision of care was appropriate to both
criminal and proto-criminal. 2
This perspective still has many supporters. One study, which
compared the legal counterparts of status offenses in five Western
European countries, concluded that to distinguish between status
offenders and delinquents was "short-sighted".3
Delinquency itself is often a symptom of family
problems. A far more reasonable, but also consider-
ably more difficult approach, would be to attempt to
treat or care for all or almost all juveniles who
cannot stay in their home for whatever reason, and
to attempt to minimize the stigma attached to any
court adjudication. 4 (emphasis added)
The emphasis in on the youth's deviant behavior or misconduct.
Furthermore, concern is not grounded solely on the child's present needs.
It is based also on the assumption that criminal involvement will follow
unless the youth's deviant activity is halted. In fact, this is the end
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the court seeks to prevent by intervention. The primary focus is on
prevention and only secondarily on rehabilitation.
Not all observers of the juvenile justice system share this
perspective. These critics do not consider status offenders to be either
indistinguishable from delinquents or pre-delinquent "problem children".
The juvenile court's jurisdiction over unruly children
is based on assumptions -- most often i.mplicit --
that parents are reasonable persons seeking proper
ends; that youthful independence is malign; that the
social good requires judicial power to backstop paren-
tal command; that the juvenile justice system can
identify noncriminal misbehavior which is predictive
of future criminality; and that its coercive interven-
tion will effectively remedy family-based problems
and deter further offense. On the available evidence
...it simply cannot be established that the behavior
encompassed by the status offense jurisdiction is
accurately "proto-criminal".5
The problem is not defined in terms of the child's misconduct or
the state's goal of preventing delinquent behavior; rather, the emphasis
is on the particular present needs of the child and the juvenile justice
system's failure to provide him with appropriate services.6 Although
both schools of thought recognize that intra-familial conflict most often
precipitates the misconduct, the aim of the first is to identify and to
halt the consequences of the familial conflict, thereby preventing
future misbehavior, while the latter's goal is to focus directly on the
behavior's precipitating factors. As a result, one concentrates on the
cause; the other, on the effect, This divergence stems directly from
their differing perceptions of status offenders and directly affects any
action taken concerning these children,
The debate is not easily resolved, nor has this ambiguity been
adequately confronted, State intervention is often justified by reason-
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ing that "children require adult guidance for their proper development.
[They] cannot,.. be relied on to rear themselves 7
The juvenile courts exist to protect children, not to
stand aside-while they hurt themselves or commit a
criminal act. Until a child has the experience and
maturity to make his or her own judgments, someone
must make those judgments for the child, 8
Those who are in need of such aid are currently identified by their mis-
conduct and not solely by their needs. The model of identification,
therefore, bears a strong resemblance to that used to identify delin-
quents, yet the rationale for state intervention closely coincides with
that advanced to justify care and protection proceedings.
The implications of this ambiguity are not inconsequential. The
emphasis on misconduct makes it difficult to avoid the delinquent-like
elements of the process. These are numerous, For example, a decision
must be made concerning the judicial process to be applied to status
offenders. The Supreme Court has held that delinquent youth must be
afforded many of the constitutional protections available to adult
criminals. It is unclear, however, whether status offenders are entitled
to the same rights. It is apparent that in many courts today these
rights are being denied,9 In contrast, the emphasis on the status
offender's needs challenges the state's decision to rely upon the courts,
rather than social welfare agencies, for the identification of those in
need as well as the provision of services,
The posture traditionally taken by the juvenile justice system
toward status offenders reflects this ambivalence. Until 1964, no
distinction was made, in law, between status offenders and youth who
committed criminal acts. At that time juvenile courts were not bound by
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constitutional mandate to provide delinquent youth with certain pro-
cedural safeguards. The philosophical basis of the juvenile justice
system was grounded on the needs of the child; therefore, there was
no reason to distinguish among the many youth serviced by the courts.
Observers of the juvenile justice system began, however, to
criticize this failure to differentiate between status offenders and
delinquents. They asserted that runaways, truants and stubborn children
formed a class fundamentally different from delinquents and that the
failure to distinguish between them was having a deleterious impact on
the status offender. Not only were they receiving inappropriate ser-
vices, but evidence indicated that they were becoming delinquents as a
result of being labeled delinquents.10 Further, it was argued that
court labeling of the youth as deviant produced some degree of stigmati-
zation and had an adverse effect on the child's self-perception.11
Eventually states began to respond to this criticism. Numerous states
took- steps to distinguish among these youth, many adopting "quasi-
delinquent" labels to separately identify status offenders.12 Never-
theless, jurisdiction remained in the juvenile court and, in most
instances, services continued to be provided by the state youth correc-
tions agency.
Added impetus was given this movement in 1966 and 1967 as the
Supreme Court required states to provide alleged delinquents with many
of the procedures of due process afforded to adults who are alleged to
have committed criminal acts,13 Advocates of the juvenile justice
system were concerned that the flexibility that had been the system's
hallmark would be encumbered by the Supreme Court's mandate.
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B. Massachusetts and the Status Offender
Massachusetts proposed to resolve this dilemma by creating a new
category of youth: Children in Need of Services (CHINS).14 The intent
of the law was to distinguish explicitly status offenders from delin-
quents. Instead of being considered as juveniles who had committed
crimes or as "problem children', they were to be considered as young
people with special needs and therefore were to receive services from
the Department of Public Welfare and not rehabilitation from the Depart-
ment of Youth Services, the state youth corrections agency. Increased
emphasis was placed on the provision of appropriate services. This
welfare-oriented model de-emphasized the adversarial nature of the court
process and promoted instead the increased use of informal mediation
between family and child in an attempt to resolve the problems that were
the basis of the child's misconduct. The jurisdiction of the juvenile
court and the availability of court-procurred services, remained depen-
dent, upon the youth's misconduct.
The CHINS program was intended to respond to the controversy
surrounding status offenders in the juvenile justice system. Massachu-
setts chose to view status offenses as a probelm to be resolved through
the use of social welfare techniques, rather than continued reliance
upon the delinquent model. Despite this intention, it is unclear whether
the Massachusetts action confronted the basic ambiguity surrounding
status offenders, Although the focus of state intervention has osten-
sibly shifted onto meeting the present needs of the misbehaving child
as well as addressing the source of the child's problems, the CHINS law
had incorporated into its structure many of the mechanisms used by the
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juvenile justice system prior to the law's adoption: the identification
of the youth through his misconduct rather than through some other
indicator of "need", arrest, bail and detention, intensive interaction
with court probation officers, involvement in the judicial process as
well as placement with delinquent youth. Furthermore, the data indicate
that the CHINS law may not be being implemented as intended by the state
legislature,
This thesis will address both of these issues. First, it will
ask whether Massachusetts has resolved the aforementioned ambiguity
concerning status offenders. This will be done by analyzing the
following aspects of the CHINS law:
1) The legal definitions of the various status offenses
covered by the CHINS law;
2) The judicial and administrative processes involving
status offenders; and
3) The attitudes of juvenile justice personnel.
Second, the thesis will address the Commonwealth's success in implement-
ing the CHINS law. This will be done by analyzing these variables:
1) Statistical data gathered from the Massachusetts
juvenile courts on CHINS youth;
2) Data describing the CHINS process in action; and
3) The impact of the CHINS law on the juvenile justice
system.
Third, this thesis will consider whether successful implementation of
the Massachusetts CHINS law is dependent upon resolution of the ambigu-
ities surrounding the presence of status offenders in the court system.
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Chapter I: Footnotes
1. L. Teitelbaum and A. Gough, Beyond Control: Status Offenders
in the Juvenile Court (Cambridge, 1977).
2. Ibid., p. 30.
3. Ibid., p. 149.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 273.
6. See A. Gough, IJA-ABA JJSP Standards Relating to Noncriminal
Misbehavior (Cambridge, 1977).
7. Teitelbaum and Gough, p. 236.
8. L. Arthur, "Status Offenders Need a Court of Last Resort,"
57 Boston University Law Review 631, 637 (July 1977).
9. Teitelbaum and Gough, p. 275.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., pp. 167, 274.
12. See A. Gough, IJA-ABA JJSP Standards Relating to Noncriminal
Misbehavior (Cambridge, 1977).
13. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
14. M.G.L. c. 119 j 39E -39J.
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CHAPTER II
Methodology
A. The Setting
Massachusetts is often cited as the vanguard in the movement to
reform the juvenile justice system. The Commonwealth was one of the
first states to establish separate facilities for juveniles in the nine-
teenth century and to hold special court sessions for minors. It was
also the first to subsequently remove delinquent youth from juvenile
institutions and to place them in community-based facilities.
Once the juvenile justice system in Massachusetts had been de-
institutionalized, the reformer's focus shifted to other areas of concern.
These included the problems posed by status offenders. Legislation to
decriminalize status offenses was introduced as early as 1970, but
passage of the CHINS law did not occur until 1973. The new law went
into effect in 1974.
From 1974 until 1977 responsibility for status offenders was
divided among the courts, the Department of Youth Services and the De-
partment of Public Welfare. The courts identified the children who
were in need of services and provided them with limited care. The
Department of Youth Services detained those status offenders whom the
court ordered to be held on bail. The agency had performed this function
prior to 1974. Generally the Department of Public Welfare became in-
volved in the CHINS process only if long-term placement for a child was
needed. In 1977 this division of labor was altered. DYS no longer
provided any services for CHINS. DPW assumed detention responsibility
19
for CHINS and implemented a new early intervention program.
B. The Questions
The research for this thesis focused on three separate but inter-
related tasks: an analysis of the Massachusetts CHINS statute; a study
of the implementation of the CHINS program; and an examination of the
treatment of children involved in the court process as CHINS. Deter-
mining whether or not the Commonwealth altered the scope of its judicial
jurisdiction over status offenders as well as examining the nature of
that jurisdiction required a careful analysis of the CHINS law. This
step was a necessary pre-requisite to establishing the extent to which
the CHINS law significantly affected the treatment of status offenders.
Study of the Department of Public Welfare's implementation of its CHINS
program was carried out in order to assess the impact of the law on the
treatment of status offenders. In addition, the process of implementa-
tion was examined in the hope that valuable information concerning the
methods used by DPW to implement its plan would be revealed. Such
information could then be used by those intending to implement similar
programs. Finally, successful development and implementation of a
program requires the precise definition of the problem sought to be
resolved. Concomitant with this need to define what the problem is
that the CHINS law is to resolve is the need to know who it is the CHINS
program is intended to benefit., Therefore an attempt was made to iden-
tify the children involved in the courts as CHINS,
The following questions guided the research;
1) Did the CHINS law affect either the extent to which
the Commonwealth intervened in the lives of status
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offenders or the process by which the courts iden-
tified the children in need of services?
2) What was the response of the Department of Public
Welfare to its new responsibility toward CHINS?
3) What was the judiciary's response to the CHINS law?
4) Who are the children who are considered by the
courts to be "in need of services"?
5) Was the CHINS law able to affect the services
status offenders received?
The following are explanations for why these particular measures
were selected for analysis.
1. Did the CHINS law affect either the extent to which the Common-
wealth intervened in the lives of status offenders or the process by
which the courts identified the children in need of services?
Statutory distinctions between delinquents and status offenders
often have been made in response to two basic criticisms:
a) That the process traditionally used to identify
deviant youth and to provide them with treatment
was inappropriate when the offender had not
committed a crime for which an adult could be
held liable; and
b) That the court's jurisdiction over status offenses
was too broad and should be limited.
One method of measuring the success of the CHINS reform, there-
fore, is to determine whether the statute significantly altered the
process by which children in need were identified and were provided with
services. Further, it would be important to note whether the law
broadened or limited the scope of judicial authority over status
offenses,
2. What was the response of the Department of Public Welfare
to its new responsibilities toward CHINS?
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The success of the CHINS law is dependent, in part, on the
ability of the Department of Public Welfare to fulfill its responsibili-
ties as defined in the statute; The method of implementation chosen by
the Department therefore will substantially affect the impact the new
law will have on the children brought within its purview and its ultimate
success in fulfilling its responsibility. Consequently, careful study
of the process chosen by DPW to fulfill its responsibility toward status
offenders was undertaken.
3. What was the judiciary's response to the CHINS law?
The juvenile court has traditionally been the status offender's
entry point into the juvenile justice system. Furthermore, the court's
position is such that often it has been able to define and control the
operation of the entire- juvenile justice system. Given its powerful
role, the success of the CHINS law is critically dependent upon the
judiciary's response to the legislation. The court's actions will
necessarily affect the operation of the Department of Public Welfare's
programs. In addition, the court has the ability either to promote the
law's implementation or to impede its success. Judicial response to the
law was therefore studied.
4. Who are the children who are considered by the courts to be
"in need of services"?
In order to determine whether the courts and the Department of
Public Welfare are appropriately responding to the needs of their clients
and whether the CHINS law is the correct response to the problems posed
by status offenders, it must be discovered who status offenders are.
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5. Was the CHINS law able to affect the services status offenders
received?
One goal of the CHINS law was to provide these youth with better
and more appropriate services than they were receiving from DYS. It is
therefore necessary to determine whether that goal has been achieved.
This can be done by comparing service provision such as that offered by
DYS, DPW and the Department of Mental Health, both before and after the
law went into effect.
C. Methodology
In the spring of 1977 the Massachusetts Advocacy Center, a non-
profit children's advocacy center, received funds from the Howland
Gardner Shaw Foundation to study the implementation of the CHINS law
and DPW's new early intervention program. I developed the research
design and, with the assistance of four undergraduates from M.I.T.,
Northeastern University and Wellesley College, evaluated the program.
Research that I performed for the Massachusetts Advocacy Center forms
the basis of this thesis.
Information was gleaned from five separate sources: statistical
data from the courts and DYS; interviews of DYS and DPW caseworkers,
probation officers, judges, DPW administrators and service provider
personnel; documents from state agencies; participant observation in
the courts; and legal analyses of the Massachusetts law governing status
offenders prior to 1974 and the CHINS law,
1. Statistical Data
A major goal of our study was to discover who CHINS were,
The courts, the state probation department, DPW and DYS are the only
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state agencies with access to that information, Due to its method of
record keeping, the probation department could only provide us with
limited data; the number of annual CHINS applications filed and petitions
issued by status offense. The majority of courts from whom we requested
aid declined to cooperate. DPW was not forthcoming with information,
either. The Worcester Juvenile Court, Quincy District Court and the
Department of Youth Services did cooperate. Most of the statistical
data is from these three sources. Its significance is therefore of a
limited nature.
DYS maintained files on all CHINS youth detained by them up until
the time detention responsibility was assumed by DPW, July 1, 1977. A
five month period, November 1, 1976- March 31, 1977, was chosen as the
period from which to select the study group. It was believed that these
youth would be representative of those currently in the system.
It is recognized that not all CHINS are detained, so the repre-
sentitiveness of this sample is subject to question. It is known, how-
ever, that a significant portion of CHINS youth were detained during
that period. Probation department data indicate that 475 youths from
throughout the state had CHINS applications filed against them from
November 1, 1976, until March 31, 1977. They included 172 males and
303 females. Of these 475, our research demonstrated that 288 (61%)
were detained at least once by DYS, Our sample group (N= 283) repre-
sents 60% of the population brought before the courts during the study
period. By sex, 180 (59%) of the female CHINS were detained and 92
(53%) of the males. Furthermore, data on all CHINS youth entering the
Worcester Juvenile Court during the same period were gathered and
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analyzed. This was done to augment the DYS data and to provide addi-
tional insights.
Any youth detained as a CHINS by DYS between November 1, 1976,
and March 31, 1977, became part of the detention study group. This list
was obtained via DYS computer and DYS regional files. The first CHINS
detention of a youth during this period we called the "pivotal detention
period". Each child's history was then traced using DYS computer data
and DYS regional files. Any court contact that occurred before November
1, 1976, was included in the youth's "prior" history; any contact subse-
quent to the pivotal detention period was considered "post" history.
The records of 288 youth were gathered. Eventually the data of 283
were used. The other five were too confused to be of any value. The
records were not uniform nor did the vast majority contain complete
information concerning the youth's background and court and placement
history. Nevertheless, information was gathered that revealed the
nature of a CHINS youth's contact with the juvenile justice system and
demographic background.
The same process was used to analyze the files of all youth for
whom CHINS applications were taken out in the Worcester Juvenile Court
during the study period. The files of 183 cases were so examined.
2. Interviews
. Interviews of 25 of the 40 DPW CHINS workers were conducted; 5
of the 6 DPW supervisors were also interviewed, Probation officers
from Quincy District Court and Worcester Juvenile Court were questioned
as well. Three juvenile court judges were interviewed and several
courts were visited. Site visits to 8 placements were made.
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3. Documents
Documents concerning CHINS youth were collected from the files
of the Department of Youth Services, the Department of Public Welfare,
the Department of Probation, the Office for Children, the Treasury
Department, and the Executive Office of Human Services. Similar data
was also collected from the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice and
from other observers of the Massachusetts juvenile justice system.
4. Participant Observation
Three courts were visited: the district court in Quincy, the
Boston Juvenile Court and the Lowell District Court.
5. Legal Analysis
Careful study and comparison of the laws governing status
offenders and service provision to these children prior to 1974 and
subsequent to the passage of the CHINS law were made.
26
CHAPTER III
Massachusetts and the Status Offender: The Case Study
The first portion of the case study will focus on the treatment
of status offenders in Massachusetts prior to the passage of the CHINS
law. Careful analysis of that law will follow. The second segment will
concentrate on the actions taken by the Department of Youth Services to
provide services for status offenders following passage of the CHINS
law. The third portion will involve an analysis of the actions taken
by the Department of Public Welfare to fulfill its responsibilities
toward CHINS youth. This will include study of the DPW CHINS program,
DPW services for children and DPW's relationship with the state court
system. The next portions will discuss the failure of Massachusetts
to adequately fund the CHINS law. Massachusetts has numerous programs to
provide special services to needy children. They are funded by the
Department of Youth Services, the Department of Education, the Department
of Mental Health and the Office for Children. The final portion of the
case study will focus on the problems resulting from the overlap of the
CHINS program with these services.
A. The Background
Prior to 1974, any child in Massachusetts, seven years of age or
older, could be found by a court to be a delinquent by reason of criminal
activity, habitual truancy or school offenses, running away, waywardness
or stubbornness.1 The delinquent child would then be placed in the
custody of the Department of Youth Services, until the age of 18 (16 for
school-related offenses). The law made no distinction between those
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youth who committed criminal acts and those who were status offenders:
runaways, wayward youth, truants or school offenders. It was appropriate
not only to discipline juveniles who violated state law, but to control
those who disobeyed parental rules as well.
The state is not powerless to prevent or control
situations which threaten the proper functioning
of a family unit as an important segment of the
total society. It may properly extend the pro-
tection of its laws in aid of the head of a
family whose reasonable and lawful commands are
being disobeyed by children who are bound to
obey them.2
No distinction was made regarding the judicial procedure to be
extended to status offenders; the liberty of status offenders was
threatened as much by the judicial process as was that of delinquent
youth. Habitual truants and school offenders could be placed in training
schools, and runaways, stubborn and wayward children could be removed
from their parents' custody and placed elsewhere. The Supreme Court
ruled in 1967 that children whose liberty was threatened were entitled
by law to many of the constitutional protections afforded adult criminal
offenders.3 Not only were status offenders afforded all the constitu-
tional protections enjoyed by criminal offenders, they were also subject
to all of the indignities of the criminal process. Runaways, wayward
children, truants and school offenders could be arrested, handcuffed,
held on bail and detained in locked facilities and placed in secure
settings for indetermininate periods of time,4
The juvenile justice process in Massachusetts prior to 1974 was
controlled by the court system and the Department of Youth Services.
The probation officer was the key decision-maker in this process. The
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officer controlled court intake and thus made the decision whether to
refer the case elsewhere and divert the youth from the juvenile justice
system or to retain jurisdiction of the case in some form. In cases
where the probation officer chose to retain jurisdiction, the case could
either be handled informally by continuing the case without a finding,
subject to the youth's participation in a special program, counselling,
or court supervision.5 If a placement outside the home were desired,
a case could be referred by the Court to DYS for placement without a
6formal commitment to the Department. Finally, when the case was con-
sidered serious or the probation department was unable to handle the
child's problem, a trial on the merits was held. If the youth were
found to be delinquent, he was placed in the custody of the Department
of Youth Services.7
Once a juvenile was in the custody of DYS, a placement decision
had to be made. A child could remain at home with DYS supervision, or
be pTaced in a foster home, group home, special school or locked setting.8
Status offenders therefore often shared their placements in foster homes
and group homes with youth who had committed criminal acts.
In 1973 Massachusetts enacted legislation to "decriminalize"
status offenders.9 The new law removed truancy, stubbornness, school
offender and runaway from the list of delinquent offenses, eliminated
entirely the offenses of waywardness and habitual absenteeism and
created a new category for these youth, Children in Need of Services
(CHINS), Not only were status offenders no longer to be considered
delinquent, but their treatment was to come from the Department of
Public Welfare, the state social welfare agency, and not DYS, the state
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agency in charge of youth corrections.10
Judged by its own language, the CHINS legislation was intended
to
1) Prevent placement of truants and school offenders in
training schools;
2) Provide better and more appropriate services;
3) Remove status offenders from locked settings;
4) Eliminate the stigmatization of youth by preventing
status offenders from being labeled delinquent; and
5) Prevent the education in delinquency that occurs
in many facilities where youngsters adjudicated
delinquent are placed.
As described in the sections that follow, however, the passage
of the CHINS lagislation did not mean that DYS or the courts were no
longer involved with status offenders. Both continued to play a
surprisingly central role in the handling of CHINS youth.
B. A-Legal Analysis of the CHINS Law
The CHINS law broadened not only the scope of the court's juris-
diction over status offenders, but its role as well. The court's juris-
diction was widened as a result of definitional changes of the various
status offenses. Prior to the passage of the CHINS law, for example, the
statutes explicitly set seven as the youngest age at which a child could
be tried for delinquency, school-related offenses or waywardness.11
The CHINS statute removed the minimum age limitations for the offenses
of runaway and stubbornness and lowered them to six for the school-
related offenses.12 This reflects the decision to decriminalize status
offenses by recognizing that seven is the age below which a child cannot
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be held criminally liable in Massachusetts. A finding of criminal
culpability or the attainment of a minimum age, therefore, was not to
be considered as a pre-requisite for the receipt of services. The
minimum age for school-related offenses was retained in recognition of
the fact that a child should not be held liable for a duty hs is under
no obligation to perform.
Similar definitional changes occured in regard to stubbornness,
waywardness, and school offenders. To be a stubborn child had been a
violation of the criminal law in Massachusetts.13 Although the law had
not specifically defined "stubborn child", the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Brasher refused to find the term
"stubborn child" so vague and indefinite as to violate the due process
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Thus, the
language of Commonwealth v. Brasher is important in that it includes a
comprehensive definition of "stubbornness" and Brasher's definition of
stubbornness is the explicit model upon which the CHINS law relies.
The elements which the Commonwealth is required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to constitute the
crime commonly identified by the use of the words "stub-
born child" are the following: (a) that a person having
authority to give a child under the age of eighteen lawful
and reasonable commands which such child is bound to obey
gave such a command to a child; (b) that the child refused
to submit to the command, and the refusal was stubborn
in the sense that itwas wilful, obstinate and persistent
for a period of time...Single, infrequent or isolated
refusa s to obey such commands do not constitute a crime,
Neither do manifestations of stubbornness which do not
amount to refusals to obey commands. But the law does
not permit or excuse stubborn refusals of children to obey
reasonable and lawful commands of their parents or persons
similarly situated, 15
31
Based in part on Brasher, section 39E of chapter 119 of the
Massachusetts General Laws states that a child in need of services is
"a child below seventeen who..,persistently refuses to obey the lawful
and reasonable commands of his parents or legal guardian." Note that
proof of wilfullness, required by Brasher for a finding of stubbornness,
has been eliminated. "Wilfullness" is a difficult element to prove in a
court of law. The definition of "stubbornness" adopted by the legisla-
ture has, therefore, been made less restrictive than the requirements
laid down by Brasher through the elimination of the requirements of
wilfullness and the minimum age requirement.
Prior to the adoption of the CHINS law, Massachusetts had never
defined the term "runaway". Neither the police, court, probation
officer, parent or other involved parties were presented with definite
standards by the legislature. In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court
never interpreted the statute as it related to runaways. The CHINS law
has attempted to apply some standards and limits by requiring that the
juvenile be "persistent" in running away from home.16 The question
must be raised, however, what is meant by the term "persistent"? Can
a child who stays out overnight be found to be a child in need of
services? Brasher indicates that "single, infrequent or isolated refu-
,17
sals to obey such commands do not constitute a crime." A parallel
application of the definition would indi.cate that a single night not
spent at home would not be sufficient for a finding of runaway, Never-
theless, no standards are provided by either the legislature or the
courts to give fair warning to the minor,
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A child in need of services may also be a child who "persistently
and wilfully fails to attend school. Massachusetts law had defined
a truant as a child who "wilfully and habitually absents himself from
school." 19 "Wilfullness" and some form of continuous absence from school
have been the elements required for the truancy offenses under both
laws. The only other change involved resulting from the language of
the CHINS law was the substitution of the word "persistently" for the
word "habitually" in the text.
The CHINS law also changed the definition of "school offender".
The offense was limited to the persistent violation of lawful and reason-
able regulations of the alleged offender's school. 20  In contrast, the
prior statute had implicated any child "under sixteen who persistently
[violated] reasonable regulations of the school he attends, or otherwise
persistently misbehaving therein, so as to render himself a fit subject
for exclusion therefrom."21 This language was sufficiently broad so as
to permit exclusion for activity not bound in any way by the school's
regulations. The CHINS law eliminated this possibility. In addition,
the CHINS law requires that a school offender be at least six years of
age; previously, there had been no minimum age requirement.22 The CHINS
law also eliminated the category of "habitual absentee".
Thus, more young people were potentially subject to the court's
jurisdiction as a result of the CHINS law, Definitions of offenders
and conditions of offenses were expanded and broadened by the state
legislature, Furthermore, an increased role for the courts in service
provision was created, First, youth brought within the jurisdiction of
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the court through the filing of CHINS applications or petitions were
encouraged, by law, to participate in a program of voluntary assistance
supervised by the court probation officers, prior to any adjudication
based on the merits of the alleged misconduct.
During informal assistance the probation officer has the
authority to:
1) Refer the child to an appropriate private or public
agency or person for psychiatric, psycological,
educational, occupational, medical, dental or social
services;
2) Call conferences with the child and the child's family
in an attempt to resolve the problems that formed the
basis of the application or petition and so eliminate
the need for a hearing on the merits. 23
Second, if a case is then brought to a trial on the merits and
the judge finds the child to be "in need of services", the court plays
a greater role than before the passage of the CHINS statute in the dis-
position and the provision of services. In the past, if a finding of
delinquency had been made the youth would have been placed in the custody
of DYS, and DYS would have made the placement decisions.24 The court
would have had no control over the decision. The CHINS law entirely
altered that procedure. Although a major emphasis of the CHINS law
was that DPW, not DYS, assumed custody and treatment responsibility for
status offenders, placement in the custody of DPW is only one of five
options available to the courts in its disposition,25
1) The child may remain with his parents subject to the
limitations and conditions of the court; or
2) Subject to the limitations and conditions of the court
the court may place the child in the care of the
following
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a) a relative, probation officer or any other
qualified adult individual (determined by
the probation officer or court designates);
or
b) a private charitable or child care agency
or other private organization, licensed or
otherwise authorized by law to receive and
provide care for such children; or
c) a private organization which, after inquiry
by probation officer or court designee, is
found to be qualified to receive and care
for child; or
3) Subject to § 32 and 33 and subject to the conditions
and limitations of the court, commit to division
of family and chil ten's services of the Department
of Public Welfare.
The CHINS law expressly forbids placement of children found to be
in need of services in any county training school or any institution
operated or designated for juveniles adjudicated delinquent.26 The law
does permit placement in a facility operated as a group home to provide
therapeutic care for juveniles,regardless of whether juveniles adjudi-
cated delinquent are also provided care in such a facility.27 The
Department of Youth Services is also empowered to provide individual
foster care placements for CHINS.28
C. The Department of Youth Services and Status Offenders
Treatment responsibility for status offenders was transferred
formally from DYS to DPW in 1974; DYS, nevertheless, continued to play
a contral role in the CHINS program after that date, Although the
CHINS law continued to provide for the arrest and detention of status
offenders, the Department of Public Welfare, at the time of the passage
of the CHINS law, felt ill-equipped to assume detention responsibility
for status offenders, The CHINS legislation permits CHINS to be arrested,
held on bail and detained pending trial.29 The law, however, did not then
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specify which agency had detention responsibility.30 It stated only
that a child might be detained "in a facility operated for the care
of juveniles."31 An administrative agreement between DPW and DYS
resulted in DYS retaining detention responsbiliities for CHINS youth.
DPW was to assume responsibility at some future unspecified date.
This bargain resulted in the continued placement of status offenders
in locked settings with delinquent youth. Furthermore, since CHINS
could be detained for up to forty-five days and delinquents only thirty,
status offenders could be incarcerated fifteen days longer than youth
who had allegedly committed criminal acts.32
A 1976 DYS memo on CHINS stated that DPW workers did little
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for CHINS detainees during the detention period. If a child brought
before the court as an alleged CHINS were to be detained, the DYS worker
generally made the placement decision, usually placing the CHINS in a
foster home.33 The DPW often would not become involved in the case until
the end of the forty-five day detention period, and then only if the
child were to be committed to the custody of DPW, which was infrequent.
When the DPW worker appeared in court his recommendation was,
according to the DYS study, frequently limited to recommending the foster
home as a permanent placement,34 The court often followed the DPW
worker's advice. DPW's lack of effort in developing placement alterna-
tives for CHINS and in implementing the CHINS law appropriately was cri-
ticized by courts, service providers and DYS. According to one group
home director;
The DPW contact ranges from zero to monthly. The problem
is that caseworkers are inadequate, untrained, have no
relationship with the kid, have no time, and when they
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do have time, they don't know what to do with it.
There is no casework or therapeutic work, The refer-
ral process of office to DPW to district to Group
Care Unit is terrible. They're a bunch of functionary
bureaucrats.35
Critics of the Department of Public Welfare recognized, however, that
DPW caseworkers were responsible for unmanageable caseloads and that
adequate funds were not available for needed services. From 1974 until
June 30, 1977, only $300,000 was paid by DPW for services for CHINS.36
The Commonwealth actively began to encourage DPW to assume its
responsibilities toward CHINS in 1975. In that year a task force com-
posed of representatives from DPW, the Office for Children (OFC), the
Department of Mental Health (DMH) and DYS explored the problems sur-
rounding the implementation of the CHINS law. This group recommended
that some of the problems of the CHINS program could be rectified by
administratively transferring detention responsibility for CHINS to DPW
and so have the entire program controlled by one agency.37 This recom-
mendation received the approval of the Executive Office of Human
Services (EOHS). A number of parties criticized the transfer, however,
claiming that DPW incompetence would prevent any positive outcome. DYS,
however, encouraged the transfer. The agency praised its own capacity
to place CHINS youth effectively given the appropriate budget, but re-
fused to fight for retention of the detention program, claiming that
such an action "would be contrary to the spirit of the law which attempts
to decriminalize status offenders, 138
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D. The Department of Public Welfare and the Status Offender
1. The Department of Public Welfare CHINS Detention Program
Complying with EOHS mandate, DPW developed a detention program
to be implemented on July 1, 1977.39 DPW did not intend, however, to
alter the process by which it had been placing and supervising CHINS
committed to its care and custody by the courts. Prior to July 1, when
an alleged CHINS had bail placed on him, the child was transported to
a detention placement selected and paid for by DYS. DYS involvement
thereafter was generally minimal. DPW contact with the child and the
child's family prior to commitment, if commitment was to occur at all,
was often negligible. DPW rarely took the opportunity during this period
to make an assessment and diagnosis in anticipation of developing a
treatment plan. 40
This model was entirely altered by the new DPW plan. Regulations
were drawn up describing a program which emphasized early involvement in
the case with intensive family contact. 41  DPW hoped that this program
would decrease the necessity for a CHINS petition and thus be a diver-
sion from the juvenile justice system.42 It was also anticipated that
the focus on early intervention, assessment and family-oriented treatment
would reduce the number of youth committed by the courts to DPW and
decrease reliance on placement outside of the home as the major and
sometimes sole method of treatment,43 These services would be provided
to all alleged CHINS coming into the system, not just to detainees.
Forty CHINS workers and six CHINS supervisors were hired by DPW
to begin work on July 1. 1977, the day when the transfer of detention
responsibilities was to occur. Most of these workers had been working
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within DPW in other capacities prior to the transfer,44 During the
three day training program provided for the workers, discussion
focused on the CHINS law and the DPW regulations governing the detention
program. The workers were also given descriptions of the services
available for CHINS, It was anticipated that some 3300 youth would be
provided services by DPW in the coming year.45 It was estimated that
each worker would carry a caseload of approximately 15 young people at
a time and that the worker would remain involved in a case for about
30 days. 46
The DPW regulations provide that the CHINS worker is to become
involved with the CHINS youth and his parents within 24 hours of a
referral from the court, 47 Interpreters are to be made available when
needed.48  If the child is referred to the Department for purposes of
detention or under conditions of bail, services are not to be made
available unless a voluntary agreement pursuant to M.G.L. c. 119 § 23(A)
is signed by either the youth or his or her parents within 72 hours of
the placement.49 This regulation is consistent with DPW's emphasis
on voluntary receipt of services and its goal to reduce judicial involve-
ment in CHINS cases. If no consent is given for placement after the
72 hours and "if the youth would be at risk by removal from the shelter
care facility, the worker [is allowed to] file a care and protection
petition." 50 No mention is made of the procedure to be followed if the
child is ordered to be held on bail by the court and both the child and
parents refuse to sign a voluntary commitment form, To permit release
would be contrary to the court order.
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The goal of the initial outreach efforts is for the CHINS
worker, the youth and parents to develop together a "plan that will
be effective in resolving the problem which resulted in referral to
the program.51 Ifafter 30 days on-going services are needed or if
the situation has not been resolved the case is to be transferred from
the supervision of the CHINS worker to a generalist caseworker in the
local welfare office or to a private agency.52 To assure continuity,
the regulations require that the CHINS worker must begin to "plan for
the transfer of responsibilities at least two weeks in advance thereof."53
Emergency shelter for runaways as well as short-term placements are to
be made available as needed. 54
DPW's detention responsibility was intended to be used as a
means for intervening early in the CHINS process. DPW hoped that this
short-term intensive effort would reduce the number of CHINS placed in
the care and custody of DPW by the courts and facilitate the transition
to complete DPW control over status offenders. In order to reduce
court involvement in the CHINS process, DPW has stressed the use of
"voluntary" custody, thereby eliminating court commitments to DPW and
judicial involvement. DPW must have custody of a child before it can
provide him with residential services. The Department must first
receive voluntary custody if the child has neither been detained by
the court nor committed by the court to DPW for placement. Such
voluntary relinquishment of parental custody removes from parental
control decisions relating to day-to-day living and educational arrange-
ments of the child, including the receipt of medical care, According
to the regulations, parents can terminate the consent, and custody of
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their children will be returned to them within 24 hours.55 The regula-
tions require that "the worker shall explain all the possible ramifica-
tions of such consent, such as the effect on AFDC payments to the
family. [AFDC payments will be reduced by the amount generally made
available for the support of the child whose custody has been relin-
quished.] Consent, if given by the youth and parents, shall be as
informed as possible.' 56.
The CHINS workers were instructed to "develop procedures in
cooperation with individual courts and probation officers for the
referral of CHINS to the Department prior to any court involvement."57
Following a court referral, a worker is prohibited from recommending
"to the probation officer that a CHINS petition be issued if none has
yet issued or that the court hear the case on the merits if a petition
has already issued" unless the worker, youth and parents cannot agree on
a treatment plan and the worker's supervisor has given his consent. 58
If tfie youth or parents refuse to cooperate in the development or
implementation of a treatment plan or the CHINS supervisor determines
that a court order is essential to obtain services from other agencies,
the supervisor may recommend that the petition issue and a hearing be
held.59 The worker is required to inform the youth and parents of the
recommendation to refer the case to the court and to review the record
with the youth and parents to "ensure that the record clearly and
accurately reflects their work together and shall indicate to youth
and parents that portion of the plan she/he will recommend to the
court. The worker shall inform the youth and parents of their right
to appear at the hearing and their right to request action by separate
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counsel."60 The regulations direct the worker to appear at all court
hearings and to present a written treatment plan to the court based
on the record of meetings with youth and parents. 61
The regulations set out the factors the worker is to consider
when placement out of the home is required. For example, the most
geographically convenient placement available is to be used for
61a
emergency shelter purposes. If the placement is deemed inappropriate
by the worker "the best alternative" must be used.62 "Emergency
shelter placement shall not exceed 72 hours unless the youth is in the
care and custody of the Department. When the worker, in consultation
with the youth and family, decides that emergency placement should
continue beyond 72 hours, a voluntary commitment of said youth to the
,63
Department shall be obtained." Individualized monitoring services
(as an alternative to secure detention) are to be made available when
necessary.64 The regulations limit long-term placement to the "best
possi'ble alternative placement...available." In those cases a child
might remain in the home under the supervision of the CHINS worker
until placement becomes available. If a child is placed outside of the
home, the regulations require the worker to encourage parental visits
to the placement.65
The regulations give the worker the authority to defer acceptance
of a referral of a school offender or truant and to request that the
youth first be referred to the Division of Spcecial Education of the
Department of Education,66
"Youths presently in the custody of DYS or on probation from DYS
shall be referred back [sic] to DYS for services." 67 This referral is
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required even if a CHINS application or petition has been taken out
against the youth. "A youth currently the subject of a complaint
seeking his adjudication as a delinquent shall be returned to the
court for an adjudication of delinquency and commitment to DYS or
dismissal of that complaint."68 When a worker determines that the
"youth's behavior is the result of parental abuse or conditions which
constitute neglect...the worker shall report such abuse or neglect to
the Protective Services Unit of the Department."69  "A mentally ill
youth in need of psychiatric placement services or a youth in need of
mental health services only shall be the responsibility of the Depart-
ment of Mental Health. A mentally retarded youth in need of placement
for the mentally retarded or a youth in need of mental health services
only shall be the responsibility of the Department of Mental Health." 70
The Department of Public Welfare did not believe it had the
authority under law in 1977 to provide detention services for CHINS
and sought that authority from the legislature. The following language
was added to f 39H of the CHINS law to alleviate this concern: [CHINS
may be detained in a] facility operated by or under contract to the
Department of Public Welfare." 1,3 million dollars was provided for the
purchase of emergency shelter/detention services during the 30 day
period. No additional funds were made available for on-going care.
2. Implementation of the Department of Public Welfare CHINS Detention
Program
It had been anticipated that a CHINS worker would work with a
case for an initial 30 day period, whereupon it would be picked up by a
generalist caseworker following either a voluntary commitment or court
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commitment to the Department, Rarely has this ideal pace been
achieved, The DPW CHINS workers were unwilling to transfer their
cases to the generalists, Furthermore, there were not enough generalists
to handle all the new cases. In a number of local CSA offices the
generalist staff is so low that the CHINS workers are not passing the
cases on and are handling both the incoming cases while maintaining
current cases as well. 71  One worker told the interviewer that he had
transferred only one case in the first three months. The reason he
had been able to do so was because "there was no CHINS out on the kid
who was referred through a probation officer. The kid was infor a
B & E." The youth, referred to the CHINS worker for placement, took
out a voluntary petition on himself and the case was transferred to the
local office. 72 Other workers indicate that it has taken them closer
to 60 days rather than the anticipated 30 to take a case, assess it and
move it on or close it.73  In addition to fulfilling its responsibilities
towards CHINS youth, the CHINS workers in the Greater Boston region of
DPW are required to handle Care and Protection cases,
A few workers expressed reluctance to hand a case over to a
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generalist; one felt that any case that got past him was lost. Some
DPW personnel doubt the ability of the local offices to handle the large
number of cases that have been anticipated. "Sooner or later if we
don't get more social workers, we are going to be dealing with caseloads
of 60 - 70 and we are going to be providing those services over the
telephone. 75
In the first 3 months of the DPW detention program, 700 CHINS
cases were referred to DPW, thus creating a large caseload.76 The
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Department tried to plan for this large influx of transferred cases
in two ways: first it established a priority system for CSA directors
defining the high-risk case demanding immediate attention and the case
whose need for attention is not so immediate. The rationale behind
this approach was that the intensive work had been done already by the
CHINS worker and the case stabilized prior to transfer. As a result,
not all CHINS youth can be guaranteed immediate service once placed
in the care and custody of DPW. Second, it hoped to increase the
generalist staff via the Department's Care and Maintenance account.
The new DPW program was ostensibly developed to assume the
detention responsibilities for CHINS handled by DYS prior to July 1,
1977. By law, a child alleged to be in need of services may be detained
only if he fails to respond to a summons without good cause; or the
court finds that a "child alleged to be a child in need of services
by reason of persistently refusing to obey the lawful and reasonable
commands of his parents or legal guardian is likely not to appear at
the preliminary inquiry or at the hearing on the merits."77  A child
may be arrested as a CHINS only if "such child has failed to respond to
a summons pursuant to f 39E or if the arresting officer has probable
cause to believe that such child has run away from the home of his
parents or guardian and will not respond to a summons." 78
In actuality, the reasons given for detaining children who are
alleged to be in need of services rarely match those so narrowly and
specifically detailed by law, Bail is often viewed by the courts as
the only means by which they can exercise effective control over a
child. Interviews and files of detained CHINS youth kept by DYS
45
reveal that these children were kept in detention centers and foster
homes as a means of punishment, to teach the child a lesson or, as is
often the case with runaways, to provide needed shelter when the child
cannot or will not return home, As one district court judge put it:
"The courts tend to torture the bail law."80 Another judge told the
Director of the CHINS detention program that he wants to be able to
lock CHINS youth up in order to teach them a lesson.
One probation officer indicated that the judge in her court
locks the CHINS youth in the court's cell block regularly for part of
the day and sometimes even overnight.81 He does this when the child
is a runaway who will not return home or when he feels that the child
is provoking the judge and is "headed for a life of crime."82 He also
locks the children up when they break their word, for example, when a
truant has promised to return to school and has not. The probation
officer remarked that the judge twice locked up a thirteen-year-old
truant with severe psychiatric problems.
Courts do not detain status offenders only to punish them. In
the vast majority of the cases the child is detained because he or she
will not go home or because the parents will not allow the child to
come home,83 Children have also been detained for their own protection.
In two instances children who attempted suicide were placed in detention
homes "just to have someone keep an eye on them."84 The children were
eventually admitted to state hospitals, but until that time they were in
detention. "The Department of Mental Health doesn't seem to want to
be involved with these things," according to the CHINS worker who handled
these two cases. 8 5 DPW has so far refused to provide secure detention
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facilities for CHINS youth, Instead, they contracted with New Bedford
Child and Family Services for their Proctor program and DARE Mentor to
provide tracking services.86 It had been originally planned that these
slots were to be filled only by those who needed to be detained in a
locked setting; they are being used instead for CHINS who need intensive
psychological workups and for whom no other program alternatives are yet
available.87
The data reveals that effective implementation of the DPW deten-
tion program has been hampered by inadequate numbers of caseworkers, a
large influx of clients, limited mental health diagnostic services, and
misuse of the CHINS detention law by the courts.
3. The Department of Public Welfare and the Provision of Services to
CHINS Youth88
The DPW Group Care Unit (GCU) is the office in the Department
responsible for placing children found to be in need of residential
placement in the appropriate group care facilities. Group care facili-
ties include "any facility which provides care and custody for one or
more children under sixteen years of age on a regular twenty-four hour
a day, residential basis by anyone other than a relative." 8 9 DPW
regulations require that all referrals to a group care facility must
come from the Group Care Unit, The child's social worker must first
complete an essay detailing the child's and family's history, Then the
Group Care Worker must familiarize himself with the child's history and
begin searching for an appropriate placement, When a facility is located,
the child is referred to the placement for a visit. As a DPW CHINS
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worker commented, however,
It is up to the individual group care facility as
to whether they want to take the kid. I had a kid
who was referred to [nine] group care facilities.
All nine of them refused to take him.90
If the child is able to be placed, the original social worker is as-
signed to work with the child's family and a group care liaison
officer is appointed to monitor the services being received by the
child.
This process rarely proceeds smoothly or quickly. The Group
Care Unit is often overwhelmed with requests for residential placements.
Furthermore, the placement selection process is involved and cumbersome
causing much delay in the placement decision. Two CHINS workers pro-
vided an extreme view of these issues by taking the position that the
Group Care Unit is incapable of meeting the needs of their clients.
Group Care take a while. You don't make a phone
call and say I've got to place this kid somewhere.
You have to assimilate a lot of information, do a
complete Group Care referral report. It takes
like a couple of months to get everything together
and get the child placed. It's not our source
when...dealing with a crisis situation. We're
trying to develop our own resources here. 91
An Office for Children employee who licenses group care facili-
ties commented more specifically on the availability of facilities:
A child is usually placed wherever there is a vacancy,
even if it is not the best place-for him, It ends up
being a very patch-work system. 2
In fact, the lack of available, adequate group care facilities for CHINS
youth is a recurrent theme of the DPW CHINS workers interviewed. As
one DPW CHINS worker argued,
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There aren't enough slots first of all, and secondly,
if there is a slot, it's up to the individual group
care facility as to whether they want to take the
kid, If the kid is a really acting-out kid, that
gets into a lot of running away, stuff like that [and]
the group care facility just doesn't want to deal with
a kid [of] that kind [it] has only to say we don't
want him.93
Even if facilities were available, the situation is complicated
by massive delay. In August of 1977, two months after the initiation
of the DPW CHINS detention program, a DPW CHINS worker noted that
the Group Care Unit had a 500-case backlog. One researcher of
Massachusetts' children's services commented that:
The average wait [for group care] is 4 1/2 to 6 months,
with the range from 2 to 10. The kids really have to
fend for themselves during this period. Many of these
kids have to find their own foster homes to stay in
during this wait.94
A DPW worker graphically stated that during this interim period the
CHINS youth "kind of hangs in limbo either in a foster home or at
home or on the streets, running, whatever "95
Even if a child is placed in a group care facility, the Office
for Children licenser doubted whether he would receive appropriate
services,
There are very few good service providers, usually only
gradations of poor ones, When people place their kids
somewhere, and say that the service is good or bad, they
have hardly even seen the program or residences of the
kids. They just agree or disagree with the service
provider's philosophy of care. Group care doesn't know
- their role as a service provider, The training is poor
...if a region likes the administration, or if they're
cool, the region may assume that the program is good.
I wouldn't put too much credence in their opinions, I've
never been with the kids, but I know there are very few
good programs, 96
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It is also unclear whether DPW is capable of keeping track of
the CHINS youth placed in its care and custody, A survey was sent to
all facilities used by the Group Care Unit asking for the number of
CHINS youth by sex, month and offense placed in each facility. The
Department of Public Welfare had prepared a list of all CHINS youth in
group care by placement for the month of March, 1977. Thirty-two
group care facilities were used by DPW to house CHINS. Seventeen (53%)
of these homes responded to the survey. When the data were compared
only one of the group homes had produced figures which corresponded to
those provided by the DPW.
Most of the group homes had vastly divergent numbers. For
example, the Baird Center reported to have 18 CHINS youth in its care;
the Department of Public Welfare claimed it was funding only one. The
Hayden Goodwill Inn reported no CHINS youth in its care; DPW stated
that it had placed six CHINS youth there. DPW figures indicated that
they were providing placements for 95 CHINS youth during March, 1977;
the seventeen placements surveyed, however, reported to be providing
homes for 143 CHINS youth. An additional eleven group care facilities
not included on the DPW March list reported to have 46 CHINS youth in
their care in March, 1977, This suggests that either there were at
least 94 CHINS youth that the Department of Public Welfare had not
accounted for or that the group homes records were inaccurate.
4. The Courts and the Department of Public Welfare
The Department of Public Welfare intended its CHINS program to
function as a diversionary program within the court systern; that is,
cases would be referred and handled by DPW personnel prior to any
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formal court involvement. The objective was to minimize court involve-
ment while maximizing service provision. The CHINS statute assigned
to probation officers, however, responsibility for assessing each case
and recommending appropriate court action.97 Court personnel were
further authorized by the law to provide informal and formal services
to children brought before the court as CHINS youth.98  By law, DPW
involvement and service provision constitutes only one of five alterna-
tive dispositions a judge might order upon a finding that a child is
in need of services.99 Alternatively, the court could permit a child
found to be in need of services to remain at home or to be placed in the
care of a relative, probation officer or other qualified person (subject
to the conditions or limitations of the court),, a private organization
authorized by law to provide services, or one found to be qualified
upon court inquiry.100 The DPW regulations, however, shift the focus
of service provision from the courts onto DPW. Without consulting court
pers6nnel, DPW constructed a plan requiring that the initial assessment
be done by CHINS outreach workers placed by DPW in the courts. 101
If placement, for either a long or a short period of time, was needed,
voluntary commitment to the Department by parent and child would be
102sought, rather than court commitment. Only if voluntary resolution
of the problem was unobtainable would DPW turn to the courts for action.103
Rarely has court involvement in a CHINS case been postponed in
the manner visualized by the DPW regulations, since the program was
implemented in July of 1977, In part this is a result of judicial
avoidance of the formal processing and procedures specified by the CHINS
law. Many cases are handled informally, almost entirely by the probation
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staff who act as social workers for the children. This has resulted
in vast procedural differences among the courts, These procedural
differences are a recurrent theme in the comments of those interviewed
for this study. One DPW CHINS worker remarked that his region has
contact with 14 different courts that work "like fourteen different
state governments, with 14 different governors -- who are judges."104
The courts, even the ones in close proximity like
X, Y, and Z, the difference in recording and treatment
were like night and day. A lot of it had to do and
still does...with definitions within the law. What's
informal, what was striking was the comparison between
X and Z, the Z court defining the intake and statistics
of CHINS kind of by the letter of the law, the appli-
cation, the petition. X, on the other hand, doing it
very informally. [There is] a huge variation in pro-
cessing. In Z you will sit down and they will handle
it informally. [In] other places, you say CHINS and
they hand you an application, and it is then formally
an application.10 4a
These differences in judicial approach to the CHINS law have substan-
tially affected the implementation of DPW's plan. In very few, if any,
courts is the plan proceeding in the manner intended by its drafters.
One worker reported that he is consistently handed a case as soon as
"CHINS" is mentioned. Informal assistance by DPW is initiated prior to
the acceptance of an application. The court does not even permit
issuance of a petition. The alternatives available to the child are
formal or informal assistance, That DPW worker's focus is on intensive
family counseling,105
Not all courts, however, have cooperated with the Department of
Public Welfare, One court, for example, has barely altered its method
of handling CHINS cases. When a CHINS complaint comes before the court,
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a probation officer is assigned to work with the family and child
through the preliminary hearing and issuance of the application. The
officer works with the case either formally or informally until he
finds that the case can be closed or that the child requires resources
available only through the Welfare Department. In that case, a decision
is then made to commit the child to DPW. At that point, the court
notifies the CHINS worker that it has a CHINS youth; generally this
occurs just prior to the actual court commitment. 106
Other courts have developed fairly close working relationships
with the local welfare officers and CHINS workers. Weekly meetings are
held by probation officers and CHINS workers to discuss the cases and to
develop plans most appropriate for the individual child. In some
instances the case first reaches the CHINS worker's attention when the
police pick up as a runaway a child who then refuses to go home or the
parent refuses to let the child come home. DPW workers get involved
immediately in such cases because they have the responsibility of
providing detention slots for them. In other instances, a family comes
to court and after discussion with the probation officer its case is
sometimes referred to the CHINS worker, Some of these cases never even
get to the application stage because the needed services are made avail-
able directly to the family by the DPW, without need of court involvement,
DPW had intended that court action be postponed once a referral
had been made, The court would become involved only if the informal
provision of services failed. Court involvement, generally, is not
halted. The court continues to monitor and process the case and, at
times, in cooperation with the local DPW CHINS worker. For example,
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in one Boston-area court, the probation department has encouraged the
CHINS worker to see all CHINS cases that come into the court, whether
an application has been filed or not. The court had originally requested
that the CHINS cases be seen by the worker prior to being seen by the
clerk, but the worker declined this responsibility and now sees the
children only on referral from the clerk's office.107
In another Boston-area court, until a petition issues the
probation staff will not become involved in a case beyond getting pre-
liminary information. To avoid the family going without assistance until
then, the CHINS worker assigned to that court meets with the child and
family before they go to the clerk for a CHINS application. Cases
tend to be handled informally in that court with no petition issuing
unless placement is warranted. In that case, this worker prefers to
pursue court commitment rather than a voluntary relinquishment of
custody. This approach was needed, the worker felt, to give clout to
the decision and to prevent the parent from reneging on the decision.
As one probation officer put it: "Parents can tear up a piece of paper
and all too often a few weeks later they are back in again saying I
can't stand the hollering, "108
Not all courts in similar areas manage their cases similarly.
This CHINS worker is also assigned to another court that has a very
different approach to the CHINS problem, A more formal and legalistic
process is used, In that court, they believe that each case should go
before the judge and that each child should be represented by an
attorney whether or not the court will place the child out of the home,109
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This variation among courts also occurs in the western part of
the state. One worker who is the DPW liaison with five western district
courts described the procedural philosophical differences among them.
One court, for example, has the probation officer handle all the CHINS
cases unless a detention or foster placement is needed or it is confronted
with a very disturbed child; "generally when a case gets too tough, they
call us." 110 Similarly, advantage is taken of DPW in another court
assigned to this worker. In two other courts, in contrast, the worker
is notified as soon as an inquiry concerning a CHINS application is
made. The court suggests to the parents that they discuss their problem
with someone from the Welfare Department prior to signing the application
so as to avoid the court process if possible. "Sometimes it's hard to
get a petition filed in X court, which isn't really legal. If the
people there feel that it isn't appropriate for a petition to be filed,
they may just interrupt it there."11 The worker found that the courts
do not really "adhere to the scheduled preliminary hearing and that
sort of thing. "112 If the worker asks whether it is a preliminary
hearing, the probation officer often answers that it is a sort of review
and that they are "moving it forward,"ll3 They do not feel that sort of
thing is important. The DPW worker agreed with this view; "as long as
they give me time to assess the case and tell the judge what I think
should be done,' 114
Courts were often reluctant to assist DPW in the implementation
of its program. One worker assigned to some of the courts located in
central Massachusetts has had a most difficult time enlisting the
cooperation of court personnel. The only way he has been able to learn
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about a new CHINS case has been by being in court on juvenile days and
looking at the docket; this is despite the fact that three letters had
been written to the courts asking for prior notification. He has
managed, however, to develop a good relationship with the individual
probation officers on individual cases.115
Many courts take seriously the parens patriae role historically
allocated to the judiciary. As such, they are reluctant to relinquish
to DPW the supervisory authority and service provision power authorized
to them by law. One worker stated that he had been working with pro-
bation officers who had been handling cases for 3-6 months and after
"six months or three months of them botching the case, they are letting
[him] know about it. "16 He detailed one situation where a probation
officer had been working with one case for almost a year. By then the
child was to turn 18 in four months. The probation officer at that
point informed DPW that a "nice secure therapeutic environment [would]
be needed for this kid for a couple of years." The officer did not
realize that the child had to be discharged from the court's custody
when she turned 18. "That's just another case of a probation officer
working with a case for 8- 10 months, botching it up and saying, here,
you take bail now. "117
Because courts differ so extensively in their handling of CHINS
procedures, treatment, and data collection, it is difficult to compare
activity among them. Figures obtained from the state probation department,
however, reinforce the statements of CHINS workers and service providers
that courts are neither uniformly nor equitably complying with their
legislative mandate. (See Appendix A.) For example, a youth referred
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to Bristol County Juvenile Court or the courts of the Middlesex Juvenile
District would likely have his case treated informally without proceeding
to a petition or a trial on the merits. In both these areas, in the
past three years, no petition has been filed for more than 39% of its
CHINS applications. In contrast, a child brought before the court in
Lowell or the Boston Juvenile Court has a much higher likelihood of
having a petition filed against him.
Not only is a youth likely to be treated differently depending
on where an application is filed, but these figures lend support to the
contention that the courts have become social welfare agencies, dis-
pensing services regardless of whether a finding that a child is in
need of services has been made. It appears that a substantial portion
of the courts handle CHINS cases informally. As a result, courts have
been able to maintain a low profile in their management of CHINS cases.
The absence of outside involvement then minimizes the ability of OFC
and others to monitor the treatment and services provided by the courts
for these youth.
E. The Provision of Funds for the CHINS Program by the Massachusetts
Legislature
The Massachusetts legislature, upon passage of the CHINS law,
failed to provide funds to the counties so that the courts could sponsor
special programs for CHINS youth as the law mandated. Three counties
have provided some funds for children's services: Berkshire County,
$1000; Essex County, $10,000; and Middlesex County, $35,000,
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 119, Section 39J requires
that the State Treasurer render "a written report to the General Court
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containing statistics showing the purposes and amounts of expenditures
for said services by the various counties for which the Commonwealth
has made reimbursement, and making such recommendations for change in
the law as he shall see fit." On November 18, 1977, Robert Q. Crane,
the Treasurer and Receiver-General, submitted his annual report to
Senator James A. Kelly, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Ways and Means
Committee. The report stated:
There were no funds appropriated to these accounts
for fiscal year 1977 or fiscal year 1978, therefore
there have been no expenditures.118
A letter to the Massachusetts Advocacy Center from Richard Kelly, Deputy
State Treasurer, indicated that the last expenditure made by the
Massachusetts Treasury Department "pursuant to G.L., c. 119 § 39J, was
for $540,20, and was paid to the county of Franklin in December, 1975.
Since then there has not been any appropriation by the legislature." 119
The Treasury Department requested that an appropriation of $25,000 in
fiscal year 1977 be made, but no funds were appropriated.120 On
December 1, 1976, Mr. Crane sent a letter to Representative John J.
Finnegan, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, informing him
that although the office had bills from Worcester County totaling
$5,030.00 and from Franklin County for $116,35, it was unable to make
payment because of the failure of the legislature to appropriate funds
for CHINS, A formal request that $6,000 be added to the next deficiency
budget to enable the state to pay its bills was made.121 On April 13,
1977, Mr. Crane amended his December report; Franklin County's bill was
increased to $123,60; a request for a $5,500 appropriation in the next
deficiency budget was made.122 On April 20, 1977, Mr. Crane lowered
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his request to $5,153,60, Mr, Kelly's letter to the Massachusetts
Advocacy Center on July 5, 1977, implied that no appropriation for
these bills had yet been made. 123
Judicial provision of services to CHINS youth is the central
focus of the CHINS legislation, The legislature, failing to provide
funds for those services, severely hampered the successful implementation
of this aspect of the new law,
The CHINS legislation also required for the provision of services
for CHINS youth by DPW. It is only recently that funds have been made
available to the Department. Between 1974 and June 30, 1977, only
$300,000 was paid by DPW for services for CHINS youth. For fiscal year
1978 the Department was allocated $3.6 million for CHINS non-residential
and emergency care. Many of the CHINS workers noted the inadequacy of
the Department's residential services for CHINS youth. DPW has begun
to seek funds for CHINS residential services; it has asked for $900,000
for 15 Group Care slots for fiscal year 1979. It is unclear, however,
whether this will be adequate; it provided services, residential and
non-residential, for over 3,000 CHINS youth in its first year of operation
of the new program,
F. CHINS and Institutional Overload
The following is a discussion of the overlap of services provided
by DPW, DYS, the Department of Mental Health and the Department of Edu-
cation. The gaps in the services provided by Massachusetts to adolescents
will also be considered, CHINS youth typically possess many characteris-
tics common to children receiving services through other state programs
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also designed to assist children in need of supplemental assistance.
For example, it is not unusual for a court to discover that a child who
has persistently run away from home and thus qualifies as a "child in
need of services" comes from a home in which he has been abused or
neglected. The court could either pursue a CHINS petition against the
child or initiate a care and protection proceeding on behalf of the
child against his parents.
Another example of institutional overlap results from the
Massachusetts Special Education Law, chapter 766. This law provides for
the development of programs designed to meet the special educational
needs of school children. Many youth involved in the court process as
CHINS are learning deficient or disabled. This is particularly a problem
with truants, many of whom do not attend school because of their academic
deficiencies. It is unclear whether these children should be treated
as "problem children" under the CHINS law or "children with problems"
unde'r chapter 766.
It has been pointed out that M.G.L. c. 766 is a potential source
of needed services for CHINS youth. This is especially relevant, as the
number of truants and school offenders in the court system has increased
more than sixfold since 1973, Although a number of school systems have
cooperated with the courts, reports of conflicts have been relayed as
well, Neither the schools nor the Department of Public Welfare appears
willing to accept financial responsibility for these children. It is
not usual for schools to recommend that parents use the CHINS petition
as a means to obtain needed services, Funding responsibility seems to
be a strong source of conflict when the service needs of a particular
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child transcend the program boundaries of various agencies.
There is overlap with the Department of Mental Health as well.
This agency is responsible for assisting those with mental illness.
CHINS workers, court personnel and service providers repeatedly stated,
however, that there is a significant dearth of mental health facilities
for adolescents in Massachusetts. "There just doesn't seem to be
enough resources for emotionally disturbed kids, suicidal kids, severely
depressed kids, psychotic kids.. .DMH doesn't seem to want to get involved
with these things...If you refer a family to DMH, they go in and if
they never come back, DMH doesn't care. DMH has no responsibility. "124
Many CHINS workers recognize that numerous children referred to them
as CHINS had severe emotional problems that the Department is ill-
equipped to handle. The Department is presently seeking funds to set
up two heavily staffed group homes, one for girls , the other for
boys , who are at risk to themselves, whose psychiatric and therapeu-
tically oriented staff would focus on assessing and diagnosing the needs
of the children.125
Although some workers have been able to get DMH cooperation,
others have not been so lucky. One worker reported that it took three
months for a family to be seen by a Boston-area state mental health
center.126 The personnel of one court stated bluntly that they had no
mental health programs available for their use,127 A probation officer
noted that DMH "is the only agency that they've never been able to
crack with the liaison referral set-up., The Mental Health [system] is
so confusing that the employees probably can't even understand the
system."
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Despite the fact that many state courts have clinics that are
used for diagnostic purposes, treatment programs do not appear to be
readily available. In fact, one DPW CHINS supervisor, upon being
asked about DMH facilities, quipped, "DMH? What is it? It doesn't
exist." Another CHINS worker reported that counseling services from
the local mental health center were available only if a CORE evaluation
had recommended such services. 128
There has been considerable conflict between the courts and DPW
concerning youth who have committed both delinquent and status offenses.
DPW's position is that if the goal of the CHINS law is to separate de-
linquents from status offenders, "plea bargaining" of delinquency
charges to CHINS positions must not occur.129 The Department insists
that its programs are not designed to serve delinquents who are best
left to the responsibility of DYS. According to one CHINS worker, the
Central Office has told us emphatically that we can say
to the judge, we will not take this kid because this
kid is a delinquent kid, but what Central Office and all
these legal people don't know is that you don't stand
up to a judge and tell the judge that...He is just going
to tell the people, hey -- that kid's a CHINS and I
don't care what you say.130
DPW claims that its programs are appropriate only for non-criminal
offenders.
The Department, however, has a legal mandate to provide services
to any youth before the courts on a CHINS complaint, Nevertheless, its
regulations require DPW workers to refer cases in which the child is
also a delinquent to DYS, cases in which the "youth's behavior is the
result of parental abuse or,..neglect...to the Protective Services Unit
of the Department," and cases in which the child only needs mental
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health services to DMH.131 The regulations also state that all school
offender or truancy cases must first be referred to the Division of
Special Education of the Department of Education,132 This policy of
referring these cases to agencies possessing the expertise most suited
to handling the problems posed by a particular case, although logical,
has not been able to be implemented effectively. This failure is most
obvious in cases in which an alleged CHINS youth has been subject to
abuse or neglect at home,
The CHINS workers are required by Departmental regulations to
refer the cases of children who appear to be either abused or neglected
to the Protective Services staff for appropriate action. Evidence
indicates, however, that courts have been using CHINS petitions and
Care and Protection (C & P) proceedings interchangeably. Furthermore,
it appears that even some of the DPW workers believe that the CHINS
route is the more appropriate procedure to use to obtain services for
an abused or neglected adolescent. "CHINS is an easier route for
probation to take than Care and Protection. The most important thing
is that the child receive some service. By law they almost overlap"
was the view of one CHINS outreach worker in the western part of the
state.133 Another noted that the CHINS route is 'easier, the matter of
who's to blame is kind of beside the point by the time you get to
that point. [We do] what we can to get the family back together."134
The worker went on to stress that if younger children in the family were
involved, C & P's might be applicable there but "the point is to get
services to the child."135 If parents are willing to cooperate volun-
tarily under the CHINS process then it is better to use that method;
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"if you go Care and Protection you're going to have a difficult time
dealing with parents...it's a caseworker decision rather than a legal
affair,"136 One probation officer sees Care and Protection as "hard
to prove [and] potentially harmful for the kid, You are tearing him
away from something he loves, no matter how misplaced that love is." 137
One judge reported an incident where he was asked to sit in
on a CHINS case in a district court. The public defender was ready to
waive the child's right to a preliminary hearing, go to an immediate
hearing on the merits, admit to the facts and to permit the child to
be adjudicated a CHINS and to be committed to the care of DPW. The
judge, after looking at the facts, wanted to change the case into a
Care and Protection proceeding, He was told by the probation department
that service provision was much quicker if a CHINS petition was used.138
Another major problem area involves youth who are 16 - 18; the
16 and 17-year-olds who are before the court on CHINS petitions and
the 17 and 18-year-olds who are in need of services that neither the
courts nor DPW can administer because they fall between the age cracks
of the law, DPW caseworkers indicated that the 16 - 17 year-olds are
often too old for available placements (which are inappropriate in many
cases) or else because slots are unavailable.139 Furthermore, petitions
may not be taken out against children for truancy or school offenses if
they are over 16 or as runaway or stubborn children if they are over
17.140 Often, however, adolescents of this age are in need of services
either of a residential or non-residential nature. Only special educa-
tion funds have been made explicitly available for the older adolescent.
The juvenile and district courts are unable to procure services for the
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older adolescent under the CHINS law because the statute does not
provide them with any power to do so. According to a probation officer:
"Leagally, we can't touch him after he's seventeen.' Welfare funds are
unavailable, as well, as long as the child remains in school. Emanci-
pation from parental control is also difficult. It can be done, however,
if the child (over 14) petitions the probate court to assign a legal
guardian other than the natural parent. The court need not respond
favorably to the youngster's request. Further, even if emancipation
occurs, the'financial assistance a child needs to live independently or
in a foster home may be unavailable.
A central goal of the CHINS law had been to separate status
offenders and delinquents. This was to be done by placing CHINS youth
in the care and custody of DPW and delinquents in the care of DYS.
Separation has not, however, occured. In Massachusetts most residential
services for delinquents, CHINS youth and children in need of mental
heal-th or special education facilities are provided by private agencies
contracting with a particular state agency. The private agencies often
contract with more than one state agency. The Department of Public
Welfare, for example, shares 94% of its group care facilities with the
Department of Youth Services; 48% with the Department of Education and
25% with the Department of Mental Health,141 Although the DPW detention
program was intended to separate detained CHINS youth from delinquents,
there are four private agencies contracted by both DYS and DPW to provide
detention services,
One juvenile court probation officer stated that his court
"breaks the law.,
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We supply [CHINS] with whatever they need. And sometimes
that means they are in groups with delinquent kids.,.
Treatment-wise, we really don't separate them. I know
the law specifies they should be, but it is not realistic
to us, we don't have [the] staff to do it effectively.142
In fact, a study by Harvard indicates that many CHINS youth and the
people working with these children do not understand the difference
between CHINS and delinquents.
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CHAPTER IV
The Massachusetts Status Offender Population
The case study of the Massachusetts CHINS program also included
an analysis of the state's status offender population. Data on CHINS
youth were gathered from the courts, DYS, the Probation Department, OFC
and DPW. This chapter is divided into two sections: the first will
describe the nature of the status offenses committed prior to passage
of the CHINS law; the second segment will focus on the status offender
population after 1974 and the passage of the CHINS law.
A. The Status Offender Population Prior to 1974
Prior to 1974 offenders were placed in the care and custody of
DYS, the state youth corrections agency. No distinctions were made
between status offenders and delinquents by the courts or by DYS.
At least twenty percent of all youth committed to DYS in the
years both immediately preceding the phasing out of training schools
(1968) and the implementation of the CHINS law (1973) were status
offenders; an even larger percentage of girls were in the custody of
DYS as a result of their non-criminal misbehavior. The DYS female
population dropped by 68% the year the CHINS law was implemented, sug-
gesting that a significant portion of the young women committed to DYS
were involved in status offense activity. The data show that the over-
whelming number of females committed to the care of DYS were status
offenders or were so charged. (Table I). Although the female status
offender population decreased by approximately 20% in six years, in
1968 and in 1973, at least 50% of all the girls in each DYS region had
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had been committed as status offenders (Table II). The data further
indicate that substantially fewer males than females were committed to
DYS as status offenders -- 13% in 1968 and 9% in 1973. (Table 1).
There was also a shift over time in the nature of the status
offenses leading to commitment, changing from commitments predominantly
for stubbornness to increased commitment of runaway youth (Table II).
In 1968 54% of all status offenders were committed for stubbornness
(which included "waywardness"); 50% of the females and 60% of the males
were considered stubborn by the courts. By 1973 there is a clear shift
toward commitment for running away; only 35% of the status offender
population was committed for stubbornness and the percentage of
"runners" rose from 31% in 1968 to 48% in 1973. The percentage of males
and females committed to the Department for stubbornness during that
six year period decreased by approximately 20%. During that same
period the proportion of the runner population to the total increased;
from 25% in 1968 to 37% in 1973 for males and from 36% in 1968 to 54%
in 1973 for females.
These figures indicate that status offenders are predominantly
female and increasingly involved with the courts as "runners."
B. The Status Offender Population After 1974
Data collected from DYS detention records and Worcester Juvenile
Court files provide valuable information concerning status offenders'
contact with the juvenile justice system. Not only does the data
identify who CHINS youth are, more importantly, it documents the nature
of judicial intervention in the lives of CHINS youth. The data also
supports the trend revealed by the pre-1974 DYS figures that CHINS
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youth are predominantly female "runners." (Table IV). It is expectable,
however, that DYS detention figures reveal a high proportion of runaways.
The CHINS law allows runaways and stubborn children to be detained
easily, but truants and school offenders can be detained only if they
fail to respond to a summons without good cause.
The Worcester Juvenile Court data includes all CHINS youth
entering the Worcester Juvenile Court at the application state and
follows them through until dismissal. Its files provide, therefore, a
broader and less biased view of CHINS youth. Its figures also reveal
that most youth are brought into court because they have run away from
home. (Table V).
1. Status Offenders as Pre-Delinquents
Laws sanctioning status offenses are often justified by the
assumption that a status offender, in the future, is likely to commit
criminal offenses. Intervention, therefore, is necessary at this early
stage to prevent status offenders from becoming delinquents. The
figures from DYS force a re-evaluation of this commonly-held assumption.
The great majority of DYS CHINS detainees (79%) have never been involved
with the courts as delinquents. (Table VI) Furthermore, only 13% of
the DYS CHINS detainees were returned to the courts as delinquents
subsequent to their involvement as CHINS. (Table VI C)
DYS statistics reveal that 66% of all male CHINS and 85% of all
female CHINS were before the courts solely as status offenders. Most
had only one encounter with the juvenile justice system and that was the
result of a CHINS petition; 50% of the boys and 69% of the girls fall
within this category. Only six males (6%) and four females (2%)
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committed more delinquent acts than CHINS offenses. Twenty boys (22%)
and sixteen girls (9%) were involved equally in both CHINS and delin-
quent acts. (Table VI C)
2. Service Provision to Status Offenders
A central concept behind the CHINS program is appropriate
service provision. The law provides that services are to be made
available, if needed, at two phases of the process: after the prelimi-
nary hearing through informal assistance and after the termination of
detention and the adjudication of the case on the merits. From the
data, however, one may draw the conclusion that despite the active
intervention of the court in the lives of alleged CHINS youth and their
families few services were provided as intended. (Table V)
The majority of those youth detained in DYS facilities returned
home at the end of their detention periods. For the pivotal DYS
detention period, of the 197 known dispositions, 153 (78%) of the youth
were sent home; whether they received any non-residential services or
court supervision is unknown. Only 20% were committed to the custody
of DPW and, surprisingly, five (2%) were committed to DYS. This is
intriguing since all the detentions during the pivotal period were the
result of a CHINS complaint; the only explanation that would accord with
the law is that these children had some prior delinquency charge that
was resolved by commitment to DYS during this time.
For the 434 total known dispositions for all detentions exper-
ienced, again most of the youth were returned home (52%). It is
uncertain whether these children received any assistance once they had
returned home. Some youth did receive residential placement or
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non-residential services and 17% were committed to either DPW or DYS.
The table below details what happened to these children once they were
released from DYS detention.
Total Dispositions for DYS CHINS Detainees
DYS Detainees
Disposition N
Returned home 217
Returned home with supervision 8
Committed to DPW 54
Committed to DYS 17
Dismissed 5
Bail dropped 1
Parents withdrew petition 1
Bail paid 1
Default (child never returned to court) 13
Dismissed following runs from detention
facilities 25
Placement by court in residential care 37
Placement in mental institutions 3
Outpatient care by DMH 1
Placed voluntarily in the custody of DPW 9
Case Pending 33
Referral to DYS 5
Case Continued 4
Total 434
50.0
1.8
12.4
3.9
1.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
3.0
5.8
8.5
0.7
0.2
2.1
7.6
1.2
0.9
100.0
The dispositional picture in Worcester is not substantially different.
A broader view of dispositional alternatives is available, however,
from the Worcester data. The Worcester Juvenile Court relies heavily
on informal assistance and minimal judicial intervention. The results
of the preliminary hearings in Worcester indicate that many of the
cases never go beyond this staqe.
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Disposition of Preliminary Hearings in
Worcester Juvenile Court
Preliminary Hearing Findings N %
Petition not issued, lack of
probable cause 22 8
Petition not issued, informal
assistance accepted 60 23
Petition issued due to arrest 15 7
Petition issued, informal
assistance accepted 26 10
Petition issued, child
non-cooperative 68 26
Petition issued, warrant or
summons issued 42 16
Pending 16 6
Unknown 10 4
Total 259 100
Ultimately 55% of all youth initially brought into the Worcester
Juvenile Court were sent home; court involvement never went beyond
initial intake proceedings or minimal assistance.
Final Dispositions in Worcester Juvenile Court
Disposition N %
Dismissed 121 47
Pending 47 18
Adjudicated CHINS 41 16
Informal Probation 25 10
Unknown 23 9
Filed 2 1
Total 259 101
Despite Worcester's emphasis on limited intervention, the
Worcester youth did receive from the court a variety of services.
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Services Offered to CHINS in
Worcester Juvenile Court
Service Type N
Foster Home 36 21
Informal Probation 27 16
Counseling 20 12
Residential Group Care 12 7
Voluntary Commitment to DPW .7 4
Educational 6 4
Relative's Custody 3 2
Care DMH 1 1
Unknown 57 34
Total 169 101
3. CHINS Youth and the Detention Process
The data gathered from DYS and the Worcester Juvenile Court
supplied valuable information concerning the length of the CHINS
detention stay and the amount of bail set by the courts on status
offenders. The figures reveal a bias directed against girls, especially
girls who had prior contact with the court as CHINS. These young women
were detained longer and were held on higher bail than any other group.
In fact, the courts generally treated CHINS youth with prior delinquency
records more leniently than those with either a CHINS record or no
record at all.
The majority of CHINS youth detained by DYS were in detention
for less than fifteen days although the mean number of detention days
was 24. Only forty-six CHINS youth were detained by the Worcester
Juvenile Court during the pivotal detention period. Although the
composition of the two data groups is not comparable, the length of
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detention experienced by both is similar. Again, the majority were
detained for less than fifteen days although the mean is substantially
less, sixteen days as compared to twenty-four days.
Length of Detention Stay
DYS Detainees Worcester Juvenile Court
Number of Days N 
_ Number of DaysN
1-14 190 51 1-15 28 61
15-30 101 27 16-30 11 24
31-45 52 14 31-45 6 13
Over 45 28 8 Over 45 1 2
Total 371 100 Total 46 100
A comparison was made between the length of the pivotal detention
period and the CHINS youth's prior contact with the court system. The
male youth who had had prior CHINS contact was detained for longer
lengths of time than males who had had prior delinquent activity or no
prior contact with the system. A larger percentage of males with prior
delinquency charges experienced shorter detention stays than males with
no prior contact. For males detained over thirty-one days, those
charged with prior CHINS offenses tended to be detained for longer
periods of time than those with either prior delinquent contact or no
contact at all. (Table IX).
For females, the detention pattern is somewhat different. The
majority of girls who had had no prior contact with the juvenile court
were detained for less than fifteen days. For those with prior CHINS
or delinquent contact, girls with prior contact involving CHINS
activities or with no prior contact at all were detained for longer
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periods than those whose prior contact had been as a delinquent.
(Table VIII).
Girls tended to be detained longer on CHINS offenses than the
boys; yet the detention length for delinquency offenses regardless of
gender were almost exactly the same.
Mean Number of Days Detained
Offense Males Females
CHINS 18 N=60 21 N=98
Delinquency 24 N=23 24 N=18
CHINS and Delinquency 9 N= 2 19 N=3
Data on bail amounts set by courts on status offenders were
analyzed. The courts did not tend to set bail at either low or high
figures; the amounts ranged from $1.00 to $2,500 with a tendency
towards $51-150, $251-500 and $750-2500.
Bail Amounts for DYS Detainees
Bail Amounts N %
$1-50 13 6
$51-100 53 24
$101-150 25 11
$151-200 11 5
$201-250 2 1
$251-500 55 25
$500-750 1 1
$751-1000 49 22
$1001-2500 10 4
Over $2500 5 2
Total 224 100
The overwhelming majority of males (92%) detained on CHINS
complaints had bail set at amounts of $500 or less; only 63% of the
CHINS girls were detained at similar levels. Furthermore, CHINS youth,
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both male and female, had higher levels of bail set than those set for
delinquents.
Bail Amounts by Nature of the Offense
DYS CHINS Detainees
Male Female Total
For CHINS Offenses
$1-500
$501-750
$751-2500
Over $2500
Total
N % . N
44 91.7 88 61.9
- - 1 0.7
4 8.4 47 33.6
- - 4 2.9
48 100.1 140 100.1
For Delinquent Offenses
16 84.2$1-500
$501-750
$751-2500
Over $2500
Total
7 75.1
3 15.8 3 18.7
- - 1 6.2
19 100.0 16 99.9
23 80.0
6
1
35
17.1
2.9
100.0
Females were also uniformly detained at higher amounts than
males.
Bail Amounts By Sex
Male
N %Bail Amounts
$1-500
$501-750
$751-2500
Over $2500
Total
60 88
8 12
68 100
Femal e
N _
100 64
1 1
51 32
5 3
157 100
Bail amounts for the pivotal detention period were examined
with regard to prior court contact. For males, amounts were higher if
% N %
132
1
51
4
188
70.2
0.5
27.2
2.1
100.0
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the boy had had no prior court contact at all. For females, although
four girls with no prior court contact had bail set at amounts greater
than $2500, girls who had had prior contact as CHINS received higher
bail amounts than girls with either prior delinquent contact or no
involvement whatsoever. (Table X)
Comparisons of bail with disposition, when possible, were made.
Generally, bail amounts, again, are higher for females. Of those
females sent home following detention 35% were held for over $500 bail;
no males who were sent home were held for amounts greater than $500.
For females committed to DPW, 26% were held on bail greater than $500;
only 15% of the males were similarly held. (Table XI)
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CHAPTER V
Findings and Conclusions
A. Findings
In recent years such observers of the juvenile justice system
as the Juvenile Justice Standards Project (JJSP) have urged that the
juvenile court's jurisdiction over noncriminal misbehavior be eliminated.
Although no state has yet so radically altered the nature and scope of
juvenile court activity, currently many states are considering ways in
which the JJSP proposal might be amended to suit their particular needs.
Massachusetts has already implemented a program that in its design
embodies many of the principles expressed in the JJSP document. The
Commonwealth, therefore, could be a valuable resource for those states
intending to reform their juvenile justice system in a matter consistent
with the principles expressed in "Standards Relating to Noncriminal
Misbehavior."
Careful examination of the "Children In Need of Services" pro-
gram reveals that Massachusetts has neither significantly altered the
process by which status offenders proceed through the juvenile justice
system nor limited the extent to which the state is intervening in their
lives. Furthermore, the data also indicate that DPW has been unsuccess-
ful in fully implementing its detention program and in providing more
appropriate services for CHINS, as envisioned by the CHINS statute.
The thesis will now turn to the more specific questions about
the CHINS statute raised in Chapter II.
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1. Did the CHINS law affect either the extent to which the
Commonwealth intervened in the lives of status offenders or the
process by which the courts identified the children in need of
services?
The CHINS law increased the scope of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction over status offenders. First, the legal definition of the
various status offenses have been relaxed. Second, the CHINS law
permits courts to provide to children residential and non-residential
services; they did not have such extensive authority prior to the
passage of the law. Finally, courts are encouraged to handle the cases
of children alleged to be in need of services informally. The children,
therefore, are often deprived of the legal protections available in a
formal judicial proceeding.
The supporters of the CHINS law claimed that the law would
remove the stigma that attaches to children involved in delinquency
proceedings. Many of the indignities suffered by delinquents, however,
were continued under the CHINS process. CHINS can still be arrested,
held on bail and detained; they must also appear in court and be con-
fronted by their accusors--generally their parents--and their activities
are subject to supervision by probation officers and the court. Fur-
ther, the fact that a child is in need of help does not guarantee that
he will receive services; as in delinquency proceedings, misconduct
continues to be the prerequisite to the receipt of court-ordered
services.
2. What was the response of the Department of Public Welfare to its
new responsibility toward CHINS?
The Department of Public Welfare in 1974 was reluctant to
assume responsibility for CHINS youth. The Department, initially,
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refused to provide detention facilities for these children, and DYS
was forced to continue detaining CHINS youth with delinquents.
Furthermore, DPW's efforts often were limited even when a child was
placed directly in the care and custody of DPW by the court. DPW
action was also stymied due to funding problems. As a result of the
CHINS law, DPW was expected to provide residential services to an
increased number of children, yet the Massachusetts legislature failed
to appropriate additional monies to support its efforts.
DPW's failure to implement the CHINS law effectively resulted
in an effort directed by the Executive Office of Human Services to
remedy the situation. DPW agreed to assume detention responsibility
for CHINS youth and, in exchange, received over one million dollars to
support its efforts. No additional funds were forthcoming to assist
DPW, however, in fulfilling its obligation to provide long-term
placements for children placed in its custody by the courts. No direct
efforts were made by the Department, therefore, to remedy the long-term
placement problems posed by CHINS youth.
The Department of Public Welfare's detention program was not
limited to providing detention facilities for CHINS youth. DPW, with
the approval of the Executive Office of Human Services, devised a plan
that could substantially alter the effect of the CHINS law as intended
by the state legislature. Judging from the statute's language, the
legislature had intended that the courts play an active role in the
treatment of status offenders. Only if the child could not remain at
home was DPW to become involved in the case; even then placement of
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the child with DPW was only one option of among five alternatives
available for the court to choose.
DPW had stated that it would use its detention responsibility
"[to prevent] long term placement with DPW and [to facilitate] when
necessary the transition to ongoing DPW responsibility." The DPW
plan, however, subordinates the role played by the courts and places
DPW as the central agency in control of status offenders. The
Department's regulations instruct its CHINS workers to assess the
child's case, to develop treatment plans in conjunction with the child
and family, and, if placement is needed, to encourage the parents to
voluntarily place their child in the custody of the Department. Courts
are to be involved in a case only as the initial referral agency and as
an aid to the Department if the child or parents fail to cooperate with
the CHINS worker.
3. What was the judiciary's response to the CHINS law?
Although the CHINS law "decriminalized" status offenses, the
juvenile courts continued to occupy a central role in the control of
status offenders. The law is readily suited to the traditional
"interventionist" philosophy of the juvenile courts. It permits the
courts to provide services to the child, to arbitrate a solution to
the conflict that brought the matter to the court's attention, to
try the case formally in a judicial proceeding and to remove the child
from his parents' custody, if necessary. Observers of the courts have
noted that the courts have acted independently of the others in
applying the CHINS law. Enforcement of the law has not been uniform
throughout the Commonwealth. Court actions, further, are not easily
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monitored as many youths choose to accept court services voluntarily.
Lawyers often are not appointed and court action can therefore easily
go unchallenged.
Many of the courts did not welcome the DPW plan. The plan was
viewed as an usurption of the court's power and prerogative. In
addition, court personnel doubted the ability of DPW to perform
effectively its self-imposed task. Finally, numerous courts have
refused to permit the plan to be implemented as intended. In some
courts, referrals to DPW occur only when long-term placements or
detention slots are needed or DPW assistance is sought- when the pro-
bation officers, after long effort, cannot resolve the problem on
their own.
Not all courts have been uncooperative. Some, overburdened by
large caseloads and underfunded, welcome the DPW CHINS workers'
assistance and the Department's funds. A few courts do not approve of
the-active role assigned to them in CHINS cases, and therefore,
encourage DPW to assume the responsibility assigned to them. The
success of DPW's program is dependent, however, on widespread judicial
cooperation. Nevertheless, few courts have responded in the manner
necessary to ensure the plan's successful implementation.
4. Who are the children who are considered by the courts to be "in
need of services"?
Court jurisdiction over status offenses has often been justified
by the assumption that juvenile noncriminal misbehavior is an indicator
of a child's future criminal activity. State involvement is required,
therefore, to provide the misbehaving youth with the services necessary
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to prevent future criminal misconduct. The data derived from this
study does not support this assumption. Relatively few of those
detained as CHINS followed the progression typically envisioned for
status offenders. In fact, in many of the instances in which a child
alleged to be in need of services was also involved in delinquent acts,
the delinquent activity occurred prior to his court involvement as a
CHINS, not after.
Further, the CHINS law was enacted to provide status offenders
with more appropriate services than they had been receiving from DYS.
The DYS detention data reveals, however, that at the conclusion of their
detention stays, the overwhelming majority of CHINS youth were returned
home with no services. Although the Worcester court provided its CHINS
clients with some services, intervention was still limited. Of the
259 youth who were initially brought into the court, allegedly in need
of services, only 39% ultimately received services from the court.
Even fewer (19%) received assistance from the Department of Public
Welfare.
Finally, the data reveal systematic discrimination by the
courts against female detainees as opposed to their male counterparts.
Not only were CHINS girls detained for longer periods of time than
were boys; they were also held on higher bail. Furthermore, girls who
had been involved with the courts on numerous occasions as CHINS were
held on higher bail and detained for longer periods of time than even
boys who had been involved with the courts as delinquents.
5. Was the CHINS law able to effect the services status offenders
received?
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This study does not reveal that any significant change occurred
in service provision with the passage of the CHINS law. Children
brought before the court allegedly being "in need of services" were
returned home without aid. Children placed in the custody of DPW often
went for longer periods without receiving needed assistance; if place-
ments were provided, in most cases, they were to the same facilities
used by DYS. It is likely that if DYS had retained control of status
offenders, they would have received the same care.
It is clear that many CHINS youth would be eligible to receive
services from either DYS, DMH, the Department of Education or the
Protective Services Unit of DPW. This is so because many CHINS youth
exhibit symptoms of delinquency, mental illness, learning disabilities
or deficiencies, or abuse and neglect. The CHINS law, however, is
relied on in many cases as the easiest and cheapest way for the
Commonwealth to fulfill its obligations to these children. Finally,
many older adolescents are unable to receive needed assistance. They
are too old to receive help under the CHINS program but they are also
too young to receive appropriate assistance from other state programs.
B. Conclusions
The conclusion will focus on the four key points revealed on
examination of the Massachusetts CHINS case. First, the Commonwealth
has been unable to successfully fulfill the goals of the CHINS law.
Second, complete implementation of the DPW plan has been impeded. DPW
intended that it would assume major service responsibility for CHINS
youth. This goal, however, conflicts with the major premise of the
CHINS law; that is, that the courts are the primary provider of
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services to CHINS youth. Third, maintenance of status offenders in the
court system is not justified. The legislature has removed from the
courts all of the power they once had to force status offenders to
accept services. Courts, therefore, have become the equivalent of a
state welfare agency. DPW is better equipped to serve that role than
is the juvenile court. Further, CHINS youth are not predominantly
pre-delinquent so there is less justification'for judicial control of
their noncriminal misbehavior. Finally, Massachusetts has failed to
confront the ambiguity posed by status offenders in the juvenile
justice system. The Department of Public Welfare has responded to one
of the motivating purposes of the CHINS law and developed a service-
oriented program whose goal is to replace the courts. The courts, on
the other hand, have so far refused to relinquish their traditional
control. This conflict, inherent in the CHINS law, prevents successful
implementation of both the DPW plan and the CHINS law.
Judged by its own language, the CHINS law was intended to:
1) Prevent placement of truants & school
offenders in training schools;
2) Provide better and more appropriate
services;
3) Remove status offenders from
locked settings;
4) Eliminate the stigmatization of
youth by preventing status
offenders from being labeled
delinquent; and
5) Prevent the education in delinquency
that occurs in many facilities where
youngsters adjudicated delinquent
are placed.
Massachusetts no longer operates training schools and status
offenders are not placed in locked facilities. Nevertheless, it is
doubtful that the three other goals have been achieved. Many status
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offenders continue to be placed with delinquent youth in detention
centers, group homes and foster homes. CHINS youth can still be
arrested, like delinquents, held on bail and detained, like delinquents,
and be removed from parental custody like delinquents. The law dis-
tinguishes status offenders from delinquents in only two significant
ways: first, the Department of Public Welfare, rather than DYS, pays
the bills and second, delinquents are in theory afforded more compre-
hensive constitutional and statutory protections than those available
to CHINS youth.
Stigmatization is often linked to the inappropriate labeling
of status offenders as delinquents. Stigmatization, if it occurs,
need not result solely from being labeled delinquent. Stigmatization
may also result from a child's intense involvement in a judicial
process that might cause the child to be removed from his home as a
result of his misconduct. Delinquents share this experience. If this
is so, CHINS youth continue to be stigmatized despite the decriminali-
zation of status offenses. Finally, the data indicate that the
services CHINS youth need are still unavailable in many parts of the
Commonweal th.
The status quo was altered little by the passage of the CHINS
law. DYS continued to detain status offenders and the courts main-
tained control over the CHINS process. The CHINS law was not fully
implemented upon passage in 1974. Status offenders were no longer
placed in training schools, as these schools had already been closed
prior to 1974. The Department of Public Welfare, however, did not
become actively involved in the CHINS program; it received no funds
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to provide long-term placements for status offenders and it refused to
accept responsibility for CHINS detention.
The statute delegated to the courts extensive powers that
allowed them to avoid the formal court proceedings required for
delinquents and to provide services to status offenders. The data
indicate that each court has applied the CHINS law as it has seen fit,
some more extensively than others, depending upon its resources and its
judge's philosophy.
In 1977 an attempt was made to remedy some of these problems,
but there is evidence of only limited success. At that time DPW
assumed detention responsibility for status offenders. The Department
of Public Welfare added CHINS workers and created a new set of pro-
cedures, the DPW CHINS regulations. These procedures, rather than
complementing the CHINS law, counter-acted it. Furthermore, the
regulations were super-imposed on the court structure rather than being
integrated into the system. Coordination between the courts and the
Department of Public Welfare has been attempted, but the CHINS workers
are trying to do the job assigned by law to the courts and to the
probation officers. Implementation is therefore dependent upon the
willingness of the courts to share their responsibilities with the
Department of Public Welfare. This willingness, however, has been
controlled by individual court philosophy and resources. Hence, the
program's success has been neither uniform nor complete.
What seems most critical in assessing the Massachusetts CHINS
case, then, is the role of the courts vis-a-vis children in need of
services. Further, what justifications exist for the retention of
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court jurisdiction over status offenses? Courts are unique among state
agencies in the scope of their power to place sanctions on those who
disobey the law. The Massachusetts legislature, however, has limited
the court's power to forceably control status offenders. The sole tool
that the court has at its disposal to force a child to accept services
is its moral suasion. If the child refuses to cooperate, the court, at
most, can remove the child from his home and make him a ward of the
state. If the court choses to exercise the only coercive power avail-
able to it, it is forced to act in a manner contrary to one objective
of the CHINS law; instead of helping to strengthen the family unit, it
divides it. Courts are typically used by states to enforce laws. The
CHINS law, however, significantly limits the powers of the court. Given
this fact, a major justification for maintaining court jurisdiction
over status offenders is eliminated.
Another justification for judicial intervention is the assump-
tion that status offenders are pre-delinquents. If that is true, then
a state may be justified in considering status offenses to be a
criminal problem that must be handled by the state's judicial system.1
The law makes little sense, however, if status offenders are not pre-
delinquent. If status offenders are not pre-delinquent and the law's
intent is based upon providing status offenders with needed services,
then there are many more cost-efficient and equitable mechanisms that
Massachusetts could employ to make those services available rather than
reliance on a cumbersome judicial process. In fact, CHINS youth can
obtain all the services available to them through the courts and the
CHINS process directly from the providing agencies: DPW, DMH and the
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Department of Education. There is no need to rely on the courts for
services.
Clearly, status offenders have been distinguished from other
groups of children in need and have been deliberately placed within
the jurisdiction of the courts. Alfred Kahn has written that "services
are provided through a 'diagnostic door,' not on the basis of need, but
on a basis of the reason for the need."2  The legislature has determined
that status offenders are in need of services, but its reason for pro-
viding them with services is obscure. If it is because they are
pre-delinquents and in need of rehabilitative and preventive services,
the data does not support this rationale. Status offenders have not
been shown to be predominantly pre-delinquent.
Many status offenders come from abused and neglected homes, but
the legislature made special provision for status offenders. An effort
was made to distinguish status offenders from the abused and neglected
chil.dren. Services are made available to abused and neglected children
as a guarantee that they will receive "the love, care, guidance and
protection [a] child requires for healthy growth and development."3
This is not "the basis of the reason for the [status offender's] need"
for services. If it were, then there would be no need for a CHINS law.
The Department of Public Welfare has developed a program for
status offenders whose purpose coincides with that advanced to provide
services for abused and neglected children. Its regulations state:
The Department's primary objective in working
with children in need of services and with
their families is to strengthen and encourage
family life while protecting the youth from
physical or psychological harm. (emphasis
added)4
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The Department has relied upon the law's intention of minimizing the
punitive nature of state intervention while maximizing the child's
receipt of needed services. If that is the Commonwealth's justification
for the CHINS process, it has been demonstrated that the courts need
not be employed as service providers. Other state agencies are better
equipped and trained to provide the same services; it is a waste of
valuable resources to duplicate these efforts.
The Massachusetts law, however, is ambiguous. There is
definite language in it to justify the Department of Public Welfare's
actions and efforts. The legislature's avowed perception of status
offenses as a social welfare problem implies acceptance of DPW's plan
to "dejudicialize" as well as to "decriminalize" status offenses.
Nevertheless, the legislature's continued reliance on the judicial
process and the mechanisms used to identify and control delinquents to
provide services to status offenders belies this notion. There is
strong evidence that the Commonwealth wants to control misbehaving
youth and to prevent future misbehavior or criminal activity, for the
good of the child and of the state, through the provision of services.
This rationale is apparent not only from the state's continued reliance
on the court system and mechanisms used to identify and control
delinquents. It is also apparent from the Commonwealth's decision to
create a separate category of youth separate and distinct, not only
from the delinquents, but from abused and neglected children, the
mentally ill, the learning disabled and those in need of supplemental
assistance from the state.
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The statute's dual focus has prevented effective implementation
of both the law and the DPW program. Although the espoused goal of the
courts and the Department of Public Welfare is the same -- to provide
the child with needed services -- they share neither a common philosophy
nor a uniform process. Massachusetts has recognized that status offend-
ers are neither criminals nor bad children. Rather, it has decided that
their misbehavior indicates that they are children in need of assistance
that the state should provide. Nevertheless, in 1973 it was unwilling
to completely differentiate status offenders from delinquents. If it
had been, then status offenders would have been completely removed from
the judicial system.
Massachusetts' experience indicates, however, that a state
cannot maintain judicial jurisdiction over status offenders and expect
these children to receive effective assistance from the state social
service agencies. The continued reliance on the courts to identify and
control status offenders has impeded the elimination of stigma result-
ing from labeling status offenders as delinquents. Furthermore, the
courts have been unable to aid status offenders effectively and CHINS
youth have been unable to benefit from the DPW plan due to Massachusetts'
insistence that status offenders remain in the courts. Until
Massachusetts confronts this ambiguity the state will remain unsuccess-
ful in its plan to assist these "children in need of services."
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Chapter V: Footnotes
1. The author does not accept the assumption that a state is
justified in coercively controlling an individual because he might, one
day, commit a criminal act. Serious constitutional considerations must
be confronted before such an act is permissible.
2. Alfred J. Kahn, Social Policy and Social Services (New York,
1973).
3. Massachusetts Social Services Policy Manual, "Protective
Services for Children and Youth," Chapter II "Definition.11
4. Massachusetts Social Services Policy Manual, "Children In
Need of Services," 106 CMR, c. 230 § 230.15 "Statement of Policy
Objectives."
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Appendix A
Per Cent of CHINS Applications That Do Not Reach the Petition Stage
Court 1975 1976 1977(January-April)
Barnstable 61 75 58
Orleans 49 Unk. Unk.
Berkshire Juvenile Dt. 42 (+27) 66
Bristol Juvenile Ct. 78 98 82
Lynn Unk. Unk. Unk.
Salem 0 64 28
Lawrence 9 Unk. 0
Peabody 39 53 50
Essex 22 42 67
Greenfield 3 3 0
Orange 0 (+ 1) 100
Palmer 55 100 (+ 1)
Westfield (+20) 38 75
Chicopee 0 Unk. (+ 4)
Holyoke (+16) 92 Unk.
Springfield Juvenile Ct.(+113) (+64) (+40)
Northampton 64 35 75
Ware 0 100 Unk.
Malden 8 31 66
Waltham 3 8 63
Cambridge 50 53 Unk.
Woburn Unk. 80 100
Concord 89 100 Unk.
Lowell 48 68 34
Newton 16 Unk. Unk.
Somerville 70 42 (+ 3)
Middlesex Juvenile Dt. 63 68 62
Nantucket Unk. 90 Unk.
Quincy 42 68 40
Dedham 100 100 100
Stoughton 88 95 90
Wrentham 73 68 63
Brookline 63 93 80
Hingham 60 (+ 2) 33
Plymouth 24 (+ 9) (+ 1)
South Boston 95 66 100
Charlestown 40 62 Unk.
East Boston (+ 5) 56 89
West Roxbury 0 Unk. 23
Dorchester 54 Unk. Unk.
Brighton (+ 5) Unk. Unk.
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Court
Boston Juvenile Ct.
Gardner
South Worcester Juv. Dt.
North Worcester Juv. Dt.
Worcester Juvenile Ct.
Provincetown
Chelsea
1975
24
84
50
55
(+23)
Unk.
(+ 1)
1976
26
79
26
55
(+ 5)
0
40
1977(January-April)
65
42
60
59
(+18)
Unk.
0
= number of petitions issued in excess number of applications.
Result of excess from :runaways" who have only petitions
issued without applications.
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Appendix -B
TABLE I
DYS Population by Type of Offense
Type of Offense
Delinquent
Status Offense
Total
Delinquent
Status Offense
Total
Mal e
N %
640
97
87
13
737 100
646
67
91
9
713 100
1968
1973
Female
N %
Total
N %
34
139
173
75
120
195
20
80
100
38
62
100
674
236
910
721
187
908
74
26
100
79
21
100
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TABLE II
DYS Population by Region for Status Offenders
Status Offenders in DYS
Males Females
23(14)* 29( 76)**
31(22)* 36( 92)**
5( 7)* 20( 95)**
13(15)* 19( 76)**
3( 9)* 1(100)**
13( 9)* 20( 65)**
9(10)* 14( 78)**
97(13) 139( 80)
Total
52(25)***
67(37)***
25(27)***
32(28)***
4(12)***
33(19)***
23(21 )***
236(26)
Total Committed to DYS
Males Females Total
166
143
72
88
32
147
89
38
39
21
25
1
31
18
204
182
93
113
33
178
107
910737 173
)*: % of status offender males to total males in that region
)**: % of status offender females to total females in that region
)***: % of status offenders to total DYS population in that region
Status Offenders in DYS
Males Females
14(11)* 16(67)**
7(11)* 18(58)**
13(10)* 23(79)**
21(14)* 29(63)**
l( 3)* 7(50**
9( 5)* 18(53)**
2( 7)* 9(53)**
67( 9) 120(62)
Total
30(20)***
25(26)***
36(23)***
50(25)***
8(17)***
27(12)***
11 (24)***
187(21)
Total Committed to DYS
Males Females Total
125 24 149
65 31 96
126 29 155
152 46 198
34 14 48
183 34 217
28 17 45
713 195 908
1968
Region
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
Total
(C((C
1973
Region
I
-II
IV
V
VII
VII
Total
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TABLE III
DYS Status Offender Population by Offense
Offense
1968
Runaway
Stubborn/Wayward Child
Truant
School Offender
Total
Runaway
Stubborn/Wayward Child
Truant
School Offender
Total
Males Females
N % N %
24 25 50 36
59 61 70 50
13 13 15 11
1 1 5 3
97 100 140 100
25
27
10
5
37
40
15
8
66
39
18
0
54
32
14
0
Total
N %
74
129
28
6
237
91
66
28
5
31
54
12
3
100
48
35
14
3
67 100 123 100
1973
190 100
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TABLE IV
DYS CHINS Detainees by Offense
Males
N %
Runaway
Stubborn Child
Truant
School Offender
Run, Stubborn
Run, Truant
Truant, Stubborn
Total
22
14
4
2
1
51
33
9
5
2
43 100
Females
N %
66
11
4
2
1
1
85
78
13
5
2
1
1
100
TABLE V
Worcester Juvenile Court CHINS by Offense
Males
N %
Females
N %
Runaway
Stubborn Child
Truant
School Offender
Total
54
44
18
47
38
15
99
25
10
74
19
7
116 100 134 100
153 61
69 28
28 11
250 100
Offense
Total
N %
88
25
8
4
2
1
128
69
20
6
3
2
101
Offense
Total
N %
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TABLE VI A
Prior Court Contact by CHINS
DYS Detainees
N %
No Prior Contact
Prior Contact as
CHINS
Delinquent
CHINS and Delinquent
Unknown
146
37
46
5
2
52
13
16
2
1
90 32
45 16
281 100
Worcester Juvenile Court
N
105
30
39
31
100
54
259
40
11
16
12
39
21
100
TABLE VI B
Nature of Prior Court Contact
DYS Detainees
N %/
Worcester Juvenile Court
N %
CHINS
Delinquent
CHINS and Delinquent
DYS Referral
Total
37 41
46 51
5 6
2 2
90 100
Unknown
Total
30
39
31
30
39
31
100100
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TABLE VI C
Status Offenders Contact with the Juvenile Court
as Dilenquents
No Delinquent Contact
Delinquent Contact
Unknown
Total
DYS Detainees
N %
223 79
54 19
4
281
1
100
Nature of Delinquent Contact
Only CHINS Contacts
CHINS Contacts plus
CHINS Contacts plus
CHINS Contacts plus
DYS Detainees
One Delinquent Contact
Two Delinquent Contacts
Three Delinquent Contacts
Total
Females
N %
153 85
21 12
6 3
180 100
Number of CHINS Contacts Exceed
Delinquent Contacts
Number of CHINS Contacts Equal
Delinquent Contacts
Number of CHINS Contacts Less Than
Delinquent Contacts
Total
160 89 66 72
16 9 20 22
4 2
180 100
6 6
92 100
Order of Delinquent Contact
N
DYS Detainees
% of Total Population
Delinquent
Courts
Delinquent
Courts
Delinquent
Courts
Delinquent
Courts
Act as First Contact with
Act as Second Contact with
Act as Third Contact with
Act as Fourth Contact with
Total
Males
N %
61 66
22 24
6 7
3 3
92 100
16
32
5.7
5
11.4
1.8
_1
54
.4
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TABLE VII
Disposition for Pivotal Period of DYS Detainees
DYS Detainees
Disposition
Returned Home
Committed to DPW
Committed to DYS
Total
N
153
39
5
197
78
20
2
100
TABLE VIII
Length of Females Detention Stay Dependent
on Prior Court Contact (DYS)
Nature of Prior Contact
Days Detained
1-14
15-30
31-45
Over 45
Total
Days Detained
1-14
15-30
31-45
Over 45
Total
CHINS Delinquent CHINS/Delinquent
N %
7 35
6 30
5 25
2 10
20 100
N % N
9
6
53 2
35 -
2 12
17 100
None
N %
100 55
- 22
- 18
- 4
100 992
TABLE IX
Length of Males Detention Stay Dependent
on Prior Court Contact (DYS)
Nature of Prior Contact
CHINS Delinquent CHINS/Delin
N %
6 37
5 31
3 19
2 13
16 100
N % N
9
1
2
2
64.3 3
7.1 -
14.3 -
14.3 -
14 100.0 3
56
22
18
4
100
quent None
% N %
100 19 54
- 9 26
- 4 11
- 3 9
100 35 100
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TABLE X
Bail Amounts for Males by Prior Court Contact (DYS)
Nature Prior Contact
CHINS Delinquent
Bail Amounts
$1-50
$51-100
$101-150
$151-200
$201-250
$251-500
$501-750
$751-1000
$1001-2500
Over $2500
Total
N(%)
3( 30)
4( 40)
2( 20)
( 10)
1( 12.5)
4( 50)
2(.25)
1( 12.5)
10(100) 8(100)
No Prior Contact
l( 7)
3( 30)
4( 27)
4( 27)
2(13)
4( 7)
15(100)
Bail Amounts for Females by Prior Court Contact (DYS)
Nature Prior Contact
CHINS Delinquent
Bail Amounts
$1-50
$51-100
$101-150
$151-200
$201-250
$251-500
$501-750
$751-1000
$1001-2500
Over $2500
Total
2( 15)
1( 8)
3( 23)
6( 46)
1( 8)
13(100)
2( 7)
6( 21)
2( 7)
9( 32)
6( 21)
3( 11)
28( 99)
No Prior Contact
3( 4.5)
17( 25.4)
6( 9)
15( 22.4)
1( 1.5)
20( 29.8)
1( 1.5)
4( 6)
67(100.1)
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TABLE XI
Bail Amounts for Males by Dispositions (DYS)
Bail Amounts
Over
$1-200 $1-500 $500-1000 $1000 Row Total
Disposition N(% N(*) N(Q N(%)
Returned Home 27(87) 21(100) - - 31
Committed to DPW 4(31) 11(85) 2(15) - 13
Committed to DYS - 2(50) - 2(50) 4
Continued without
a Finding 1(17) 5(83) 1(17) - 6
Pending 1(25) 2(50) 2(50) - 4
Referred to DYS - - 1(100) - 1
Sent to Hospital 1(100) 1(100) - - 1
Total 34(57) 52(87) 6(10) 2(3) 60
(%) row percentages
Bail Amounts for Females by Disposition (DYS)
Bail Amounts
Over
$1-200 $1-500 $500-1000 $1000 Row Total
Disposition N(%) N(%) N(%) N(*)
Returned Home 33(46) 47(65) 22(29) 4(6) 73
Committed to DPW 8(35) 17(74) 4(17) 2(9) 23
Voluntary Custody
to DPW 3(43) 4(57) 2(29) 1(14) 7
Committed to DYS 1(25) 2(50) - 2(50) 4
Referred to DYS 1(100) - - - 1
Run - Release 3(33) 5(56) 4(44) - 9
Group Home Referral 5(83) 5(83) 1(17) - 6
Pending 6(31) 13(65) 5(25) 2(10) 20
Petition Withdrawn - 2(100) - - 2
Dismissed 1(100) - - - 1
Relative's Custody - - 1(100) - 1
DMH Outpatient - - 1(100) - 1
Default - - 1(100) - 1
Foster Home - - 1(100) - 1
Total 61(40) 98(65) 43(28) 11(7) 151
(%) = row percentages
